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ABSTRACT
ESSAYS IN APPLIED MACROECONOMICS
EM·INE ZEREN TAS¸PINAR
Ph.D. Dissertation, June 2016
Supervisor: Asst. Prof. Remzi Kaygusuz
Keywords: Cross-country income di¤erences, labor mobility, residual wage
inequality, heterogeneous rms, frictional markets
This dissertation consists of two chapters each of which investigates di¤erent ques-
tions in quantitative macroeconomics. In the rst chapter, I scrutinize the regional
(EU including Turkey) and locational economic implications of removing barriers to
labor mobility between Turkey and the EU. I use the growth model with endogenous
labor movements developed in Klein and Ventura (2009). I set model parameters
so that the model economy is consistent with EU and Turkish economies in 2010.
Findings show that removing barriers to labor mobility, fully and partially, generates
regional output growth in the long-run at range 6.2%-8% while growth in regional
capital is between 6%-8%. Besides, welfare gains for young natives in Turkey are
at range 1.06%-2.04%. Yet, young natives in the EU are exposed to welfare losses
which changes between 0.08% and 0.13%. In the second chapter, I explore the
quantitative role of nancial development in the rise of residual wage inequality in
the US. I built an incomplete-markets model in which homogenous workers work in
rms possessing heterogeneous investment e¢ ciency. Labor and nancial markets
are frictional. Financial development means an increase in rmscapacity to borrow.
I set model parameters so that the benchmark economy -that is pre-nancial devel-
opment economy- is consistent with the US economy in between 1974Q1-1979Q4.
Findings show that variance of wages increase by 2.8% after nancial development.
However, variance of log-wages decreases by 8.6% suggesting that there is a large
increase in average wage as a result of overall improvement in the economy after
nancial development.
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ÖZET
UYGULAMALI MAKROEKONOM·I ALANINDA MAKALELER
EM·INE ZEREN TAS¸PINAR
Doktora Tezi, Haziran 2016
Tez Dan¬¸sman¬: Yrd. Doç. Dr. Remzi Kaygusuz
Anahtar Kelimeler : Ülkeleraras¬gelir farklar¬, i¸sgücü hareketlili¼gi, gözlemlenebilir
benzer özelliklere sahip çal¬¸sanlar aras¬ndaki ücret es¸itsizli¼gi, heterojen rmalar,
sürtünmeli piyasalar
Bu tez farkl¬ kantitatif makroekonomik sorular¬ inceleyen iki bölümden olus¸mak-
tad¬r. ·Ilk bölümde TürkiyeAB aras¬nda i¸sgücü hareketlili¼gini k¬s¬tlayan maliyetlerin
kald¬r¬lmas¬n¬n, bölgesel (Türkiyeyi kapsayan AB) ve yerel ölçekte, ekonomik etki-
leri aras¸t¬r¬lmaktad¬r. Klein ve Ventura (2009)da geli¸stirilmi¸s olan, i¸sgücü hareket-
lerinin endojen oldu¼gu bir büyüme modeli kullan¬lmaktad¬r. Model parametreleri,
modeli 2010 y¬l¬Türkiye ve AB ekonomileriyle tutarl¬yapacak s¸ekilde seçilmi¸stir.
·I¸sgücü hareketlili¼gini k¬s¬tlayan maliyetlerin, tamamen ve k¬smen, kald¬r¬lmas¬yla
yap¬lan analizlerin sonuçlar¬na göre uzun dönemde bölgesel üretim%6.2-%8 aras¬nda,
bölgesel sermaye ise %6-%8 aras¬nda artmaktad¬r. Türkiye do¼gumlu genç neslin re-
fah art¬¸s¬%1.06 ve %2.04 aras¬nda de¼gi¸sirken, AB do¼gumlu genç nesil refah kayb¬na
u¼gramaktad¬r ve bu kay¬p %0.08-%0.13 aras¬nda de¼gi¸smektedir. ·Ikinci bölümde,
nansal piyasalardaki geli¸smenin, ABDde gözlemlenebilir benzer özelliklere sahip
(homojen) çal¬¸sanlar aras¬ndaki ücret es¸itsizli¼gi art¬¸s¬nda oynad¬¼g¬rol aras¸t¬r¬lmak-
tad¬r. Bu amaçla, homojen çal¬¸sanlar¬n yat¬r¬m yapma kabiliyetlerine göre fark-
l¬las¸an (heterojen) rmalarda çal¬¸st¬¼g¬ eksik piyasa modeli geli¸stirilmi¸stir. Model
ekonomisinde i¸sgücü ve nansal piyasalar sürtünmelidir. Finansal piyasalardaki
geli¸sme, sürtünmenin azalmas¬ ve rmalar¬n daha çok borçlanabilmesi anlam¬na
gelmektedir. Finansal piyasalardaki geli¸sme öncesi ekonomiyi temsil eden referans
ekonominin parametleri, model ekonominin 1974Ç1-1979Ç4 aras¬ABD ekonomisiyle
tutarl¬olmas¬n¬sa¼glayacak s¸ekilde seçilmi¸stir. Finansal piyasalarda rmalar¬n borçlan-
ma k¬s¬t¬n¬n azalt¬lmas¬yla yap¬lan al¬¸st¬rman¬n sonuçlar¬na göre nansal geli¸sme
sonras¬ ücretlerin varyans¬%2.8 artarken ücretlerin logaritmas¬n¬n varyans¬%8.6
azalmaktad¬r. Bu sonuç nansal piyasalardaki geli¸smenin ekonominin bütününü iyi-
les¸tirmesinden ve ortalama ücretlerde yüksek bir art¬¸s olmas¬ndan kaynaklanmak-
tad¬r.
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CHAPTER 1
ECONOMIC IMPLICATIONS OF LABOR MARKET
INTEGRATION BETWEEN THE EU AND TURKEY
1.1 Introduction
An eventual accession of Turkey to the European Union (EU) has a wide range
of economic implications for both locations and for the region, that is EU including
Turkey. In this paper, I focus only on one of the major economic changes expected
after Turkeys membership to the EU: labor market integration.1 So, the aim of this
study is to explore the long run and transitional economic outcomes of counterfac-
tually removing barriers to labor mobility leading to a free movement of workers in
the region and assess quantitatively possible changes in population, output, capital
and welfare.2
After a probable labor market integration including Turkey and the EU, workers
might choose to migrate because of the income di¤erential across these locations. In
the presence of labor mobility costs, total factor productivity (TFP) disparity and
labor quality di¤erences between Turkey and the EU potentially lead to this income
di¤erential so that the per capita incomes are higher in the EU compared to Turkey.
This gap creates an incentive for Turkish residents to migrate to the EU and they
start to migrate with the removal of barriers to labor mobility. The quantitative
implications of this labor movement on output and welfare are unknown.3 This
1It is important to note that labor market integration may happen not only as a result of EU
membership but any kind of engagement removing barriers to labor mobility between Turkey and
the EU may also create an integrated labor market.
2A full evaluation of Turkeys accession to the EU in terms of economic implications is out of
this papers scope. So, economic implications of accession to the internal market a¤ecting trade,
foreign direct investments and domestic investments in Turkey; institutional reforms a¤ecting
Turkeys competitiveness in the world economy or nancial transfers are not considered in this
paper.
3Previously, Lejour and Mooij (2005), Ayd¬n and Acar (2010), and Özgüzer and Pensieroso
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paper ll this gap by quantitatively exploiting the growth model with endogenous
labor movements developed in Klein and Ventura (2009).4
Klein and Ventura (2009) asserts that barriers to labor movement in the pres-
ence of TFP di¤erences cause labor misallocation across locations. The mechanism
behind this outcome is as follows: i) barriers that limit labor mobility between loca-
tions having di¤erent total factor productivities cause a di¤erential in marginal labor
productivities across these locations; ii) this di¤erential motivates workers to move
from low to high productivity locations; iii) labor mobility costs across these loca-
tions limit the movement and lead to labor misallocation. Accordingly, one might
expect that lifting labor mobility frictions improves labor allocation across these lo-
cations, so leads to a rise in the regional output. Moreover, frictionless movement of
capital across locations magnify regional gains from removal of labor mobility costs.
It is because in this case marginal product of labor is higher compared to the case
where capital movement is limited.
As in Klein and Ventura (2009), model consists of two locations with di¤erent
TFP levels each of which has access to the same production function. One single
dated good is produced by using a constant returns to scale production function with
three factors; capital, labor and land. Capital is perfectly mobile across locations and
individuals are free to buy and sell land in both locations. Yet, labor is imperfectly
mobile. The economy is composed of workers who live for a nite number of periods.
They are heterogenous regarding their birth location, age, and utility cost of living
in a location di¤erent than their birth location. Workersskill levels di¤er by their
age and birth locations. In each period, workers decide how much to consume,
how many units of land to purchase and how much to save, as well as whether
and when to move. If a worker chooses to move they are subject to three types of
movement cost; utility cost of living in a location other than his birth location, one
time resource cost of moving and skill loss for migrants. Finally, workers are not
(2013) explore implications of labor mobility after an eventual Turkish accession to the EU using
a general equilibrium setup. However, in none of them migration decision is modeled as a choice
variable of a worker. Yet, in the current paper movement decision is taken by a worker. Moreover,
skill di¤erential between Turkey and the EU is not considered in the aforementioned papers. Only
Lejour and Mooij (2005), evaluates Turkish membership under two cases in order to take into
account the skill di¤erential across locations: in the rst case they assume that Turkish immigrants
and the EU have the same skill distribution and in the second case they assume that Turkish
immigrants are composed of only low skilled workers while in the EU there are both low and
high skilled workers. In the current paper, the considered skill di¤erential between Turkey and
the EU is in line with the educational attainment data in both locations. Besides, the model in
the current paper take into account various movement costs and this makes models assessments
about migration outcomes more accurate. Finally, this paper scrutinize transitional implications
of migration in addition to its steady state results while the previous general equilibrium analyses
examine only the long-run outcomes of migration.
4The current paper is a quantitative application of the model provided in Klein and Ventura
(2009).
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allowed to move in debt or by borrowing.
The model is parameterized to evaluate the outcomes of any kind of engagement
mitigating labor mobility costs between Turkey and the EU.5 Because of data avail-
ability I calibrate my benchmark economy to EU and Turkish economies in 2010.
The counterfactual analysis I made is removing, partially and fully, the resource cost
of moving. Each of these cases are explored for conditions with and without skill
loss associated to migration. In the long-run, for the highest value of resource cost
of moving and in the presence of skill loss, 76% of the Turkish population migrates
to the EU. This leads to an increase in regional capital by 6% and an increase in
regional output by 6.2%. On the other hand, when the resource moving cost is fully
removed and there is no skill loss 99% of the Turkish population moves to the EU
generating 8% of increase in both regional capital and output.
Moreover, I examine transitional welfare implications of labor market integration
driven by partial removal of resource moving cost in the presence of a skill loss
for economies with high and low utility costs of moving. Since wages and land
prices change over time and across locations by migration, its welfare implications
di¤erentiate regarding generations and nationalities. Welfare gain of young natives
in Turkey is 1:06% in an economy with high utility costs while it is 2.04% in an
economy with low utility costs. Meanwhile, young natives in the EU are exposed to
welfare losses which are 0:08% and 0:13%, respectively.
Related Literature
The current paper is related to the literature that study economic implications
of Turkish accession to the EU. Most of the previous studies examining economic
outcomes of Turkeys membership to the EU also focus on migration. However,
the majority of these studies interest is on the calculation of potential Turkish
immigrantsvolume. These studies can be classied in two groups: the rst group
forecast the volume after estimating a model of migration (Flam (2003), Togan
(2004), Erzan et al. (2006)) and the second group use a survey to report the potential
volume of immigrants (Krieger and Maitre (2007)).
On the other hand, there are general equilibrium models that scrutinize economic
5In this paper, EU is the European Economic Area before the enlargement in 2004. The
European Economic Area consists of the European Union, Iceland, Liechtenstein and Norway. I
limit myself to the European Economic Area before 2004 because I assume that in any case in
which such an engagement comes into force, residents of Turkey who want to migrate move to
the old EU member countries. This assumption is consistent with the past immigration data
of Turkish residents. They choose to move to Germany in the rst place. According to OECD
migration data, in between 1985-2011 per year average share of Turkish residents in Germany is
81%. Having 6% of Turkish migrants for the same period, Netherlands is the second country chosen
by Turkish residents to migrate. Hosting 3% of Turkish migrants by each, Austria and Belgium
are the subsequent most preferred locations to move. Thus, historically more than 90% of Turkish
migrants choose to move to old EU countries.
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e¤ects of Turkish accession to the EU. Lejour and Mooij (2005) uses WorldScan
model and evaluate economic implications of Turkeys membership to the EU in
three aspects: accession to the internal European market, institutional reforms in
Turkey triggered by EU membership leading to an improvement in competitive
position of Turkey, and migration.6 Ayd¬n and Acar (2010) assesses outcomes of
three changes that occur by Turkeys EU membership: free movement of labor,
capital and, with a particular focus, a reduction in CO2 emissions, by using Global
Trade Analysis Project (GTAP) model.7 The most recent work on this subject is
by Özgüzer and Pensieroso (2013) where they analyze the implications of Turkeys
accession to the EU by exploring the e¤ect of nancial transfers from the EU to
Turkey on Europeanswelfare. They consider change in labor mobility cost only in
the context of its impact on welfare implications of nancial transfers.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 1.2 presents the model.
Section 1.3 describes the parameterization of the benchmark economy. Section 1.4
explores, respectively, steady-state, transitional and welfare outcomes of the model.
Section 1.5 concludes.
1.2 The Model
1.2.1 Environment
I use the model economy developed in Klein and Ventura (2009).8 It is a discrete
time economy and consists of two locations (x), rich (x = R) and poor (x = P ).
In each location there is a representative rm with di¤erent productivity levels.
However, rms use the same production technology with three inputs: capital, labor
and land. Land is xed in each location.
Economy is composed of a continuum of workers of total measure one. In each
period t, the population in location R is denoted by NR (t) while it is NP (t) in
location P; and the total population in the economy is given by NR (t)+NP (t) = 1:
Workers are born at the beginning of each period and live for J periods. Workers who
die are replaced with the same amount of newborns keeping economys population
6WorldScan model is a computational general equilibrium model based on neoclassical theo-
ries of growth and international trade. It is a multi-country and multi-sector model with CES
production function.
7GTAP is a multi-region, multi-sector computational general equilibrium model with perfect
competition and constant returns to scale production function.
8I mostly stick to their notation.
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stationary.
Workers are heterogenous with respect to their birth location, y 2 fR;Pg and
age, j: Each worker is endowed with an e¢ ciency units of labor which depends on his
age and birth place, e (j; y) : This implies that workersskill levels are di¤erentiated
with respect to their age and birth location. In each period t; a worker decides
how much to consume, c (j), save in capital, k (j) ; and/or land, f (j; x) as well as
whether and when to move, ' (j). The worker who chooses to move from his birth
location (y) to the other location (x 2 fR;Pg), which will be his current location,
incurs three types of moving cost. First, he has to pay a xed cost which is common
to all who wants to move. It is a resource cost of moving, m. Second, he is subject
to a utility cost of living away from his birth location which is specic to a worker. It
is psychic moving cost, : The type of worker regarding this cost, which is noted by
i, is drawn from a distribution function  (i) at his birth and does not change as he
gets older. Third, a worker who moves looses a proportion, ; of his e¢ ciency units
of labor, e (j; y). This is called skill cost of moving.  is the same for all workers
who choose to move. In addition, workers cannot move with debt.
In the model economy capital freely moves within and between two locations
equating capitals rate of returns across locations, rk (x; t) = r (t) : As another tool
for saving, a worker from one location can buy and sell land in each location at price
p (x; t). There is no arbitrage between capital and land.
Although labor mobility across locations is costly, labor market is perfectly com-
petitive in each location. Thus, the wage rate in each location at time t is w (x; t). If
a worker has not moved from his birth location, i.e. x = y, then his income at period
t is w (x; t) e (j; x) ; but if his current location is di¤erent from his birth location, i.e.
x 6= y; then his income is w (x; t) (1  ) e (j; y) because of skill loss incurred after
migration. Retirement is not considered in the model, so workers earn wage till they
die.
1.2.2 Workers Problem
The objective of worker i who is born at time t in location y is to maximize
JX
j=1
j 1

U (c (j))   (i)fx(j) 6=yg

where x (j) is the current location of the worker at age j; and  is the indicator
function. The function U (:) is continuous, strictly increasing and strictly concave.
The budget constraint of worker i, at age j and who has not moved in the past,
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i.e. x = y; is given by
c (j) + k (j + 1) +
X
x2fR;Pg
p (x; t) f (j + 1; x) + ' (j)m
= (1 + r (t)) k (j) +
X
x2fR;Pg
(p (x; t) +R (x; t)) f (j; x) + w (x; t) e (j; y)
where r (t) ; p (x; t) and R (x; t) are, respectively, return on capital, price of land and
return on land in period t; in location x:Worker chooses c (j) ; k (j + 1) ; f (j + 1; x)
for each j 2 [1; J ] and decides whether to move or not. If he chooses to move at age
j then ' (j) = 1; otherwise it is equal to 0.
On the other hand, the budget constraint of worker i, at age j and who has
already moved prior age j, i.e. x 6= y; is given by
c (j) + k (j + 1) +
X
x2fR;Pg
p (x; t) f (j + 1; x)
= (1 + r (t)) k (j) +
X
x2fR;Pg
(p (x; t) +R (x; t)) f (j; x) + w (x; t) (1  ) e (j; y)
Notice that the di¤erence in formulation of two budget constraints stems from
moving costs. The worker who has migrated has already incurred to the resource cost
of moving and since it is paid for once it does not appear in the budget constraint of
immigrant worker. However, because immigrant workers skill loss is permanent, his
income loss due to migration is also permanent. In every period, immigrant worker
also chooses c (j) ; k (j + 1) and f (j + 1; x) :
A worker can save both in capital and land but arbitrage is not possible between
them. The no arbitrage condition is given by
1 + r (t) =
R (x; t) + p (x; t)
p (x; t  1) for x 2 fR;Pg
By iterating forward the no arbitrage condition, we obtain price of land in loca-
tion x 2 fR;Pg ; at period t:
p (x; t) =
1X
s=1
R (x; t+ s)
si=1 (1 + r (t+ i))
Using the no arbitrage condition, if we plug-in the term (1 + r (t)) p (x; t  1) to
the budget constraints in place of the term R (x; t) + p (x; t) ; the budget constraint
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of the non-immigrant becomes
c (j) + k (j + 1) +
X
x2fR;Pg
p (x; t) f (j + 1; x) + ' (j)m
= (1 + r (t))
0@k (j) + X
x2fR;Pg
p (x; t  1) f (j; x)
1A+ w (x; t) e (j; y)
while that of the immigrant is given by
c (j) + k (j + 1) +
X
x2fR;Pg
p (x; t) f (j + 1; x)
= (1 + r (t))
0@k (j) + X
x2fR;Pg
p (x; t  1) f (j; x)
1A+ w (x; t) (1  ) e (j; y)
Moreover, since capital and land are the same asset in equilibrium, a unique
asset denition for the current period can be made as follows, a (j)  k (j) +P
x2fR;Pg p (x; t  1) f (j; x). Then budget constraints of the non-immigrant and
the immigrant worker can be, respectively, written as follows
c (j) + a (j + 1) + ' (j)m = (1 + r (t)) a (j) + w (x; t) e (j; y)
c (j) + a (j + 1) = (1 + r (t)) a (j) + w (x; t) (1  ) e (j; y)
By solving the problem described above the agent decides how much to consume,
c (j) ; how much to save, a (j + 1) and, whether and when to move, ' (j) :
Now we are ready to dene the problem in a recursive way. Note that in each
date, t; the state of a worker is given by his current asset level a; his psychic cost type
i; his age j; his current location x; and his birthplace y: Then the choice variables
of the agent are c (a; i; j; x; y; t) ; a0 (a; i; j; x; y; t) and ' (a; i; j; x; y; t) which will be
written as c; a0 and ' hereafter for notational simplicity. Note that  x is used in
order to dene the other location so that  R = P and vice versa.
As mentioned before, there are two cases according to which the problem den-
ition di¤ers: in the rst case the worker has already moved in the past (x 6= y) and
no future migration is allowed by assumption; in the second case the worker lives in
his birthplace (x = y) and the migration is still a possible option.
Case 1: x 6= y
v (a; i; j; x; x; t) = max
c;a0
fU (c)   (i) + v (a0; i; j + 1; x; x; t+ 1)g (1)
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subject to
c+ a0  (1 + r (t)) a+ w (x; t) (1  ) e (j; y)
a0  0; for j = J
v (a; i; J + 1; x; y; t)  0
Case 2: x = y
v (a; i; j; x; x; t) = max
c;a0;'
fU (c) +  ['v (a0; i; j + 1; x; x; t+ 1) (2)
+(1  ') v (a0; i; j + 1; x; x; t+ 1)]g
subject to
' =
(
1 if agent chooses to move
0 if agent chooses to stay
c+ a0 + 'm  (1 + r (t)) a+ w (x; t) e (j; y)
'a0  0
a0  0 for j = J
v (a; i; J + 1; x; x; t)  0
v (a; i; J + 1; x; x; t)  0
Note that there are two di¤erent limitations on asset holdings. Constraint, a0  0
for j = J; prevents a worker, either immigrant or non-immigrant, from borrowing in
the last period of his life while 'a0  0 deters the movement of a worker with debt
when he chooses to move.
1.2.3 Firms Problem
There is one representative rm in each location producing the same single dated
good. Each rm produces by Cobb-Douglas production technology using capital,
K (x; t) ; labor, L (x; t) and land, F (x) which is given by
Y (x; t) = G (K (x; t) ; L (x; t) ; F (x) ;A (x)) = A (x)K (x; t)L (x; t)F 1   (x)
Land is xed in each location generating decreasing returns for each inputs.
Firmsproductivity levels, A (x) ; di¤er with respect to their location but constant
8
across time. The objective of each rm is to maximize its prot which is given by
G (K (x; t) ; L (x; t) ; F (x) ;A (x))  er (x; t)K (x; t)  w (x; t)L (x; t) R (x; t)F (x)
and choose K (x; t) ; L (x; t) and F (x) :
Equilibrium conditions obtained from rms problem provide market prices which
are provided below
er (x; t) = G1 (K (x; t) ; L (x; t) ; F (x) ;A (x))
Since rk (x; t) = er (x; t)  ; then
rk (x; t) = G1 (K (x; t) ; L (x; t) ; F (x) ;A (x))  
w (x; t) = G2 (K (x; t) ; L (x; t) ; F (x) ;A (x))
R (x; t) = G3 (K (x; t) ; L (x; t) ; F (x) ;A (x))
1.2.4 Aggregation
Let  (B; I; j; x; y; t) be the mass of people with asset position a 2 B; type i 2 I;
age j; working in location x in period t; and born in location y: The function  is
dened for all B  R; all I  I, all j 2 J where J = f1; 2; :::; Jg and all x and y in
fR;Pg : Except newborn workers, i.e. workers with j = 1, distribution of workers
is consistent with workersdecisions (provided in section 1.2.5). Mass of newborns
is set exogenously and given by
 (B; I; 1; x; y; t) =
(
Nx(t)
J
R
I  (i) di if 0 2 B and x = y
0 otherwise
There are two things to note about newborns; they are born with zero assets and
their current location is their birth location.
Given the distribution of workers at each state, the aggregate labor supply in
location x 2 fR;Pg is provided below:
LS (x; t) =
JX
j=1
Z
RI
e (j; x) d (a; i; j; x; x; t)+
JX
j=1
Z
RI
(1  ) e (j; x) d (a; i; j; x; x; t)
Notice that, in each location aggregate labor supply is composed of workforce whose
birth location and current location are the same (the rst term of RHS) and who
9
has migrated from other location (the second term of RHS).
Similarly, the aggregate asset supply in the economy is given by
AS (t) =
X
x2fR;Pg
(
JX
j=1
Z
RI
ad (a; i; j; x; x; t) +
JX
j=1
Z
RI
ad (a; i; j; x; x; t)
)
1.2.5 Equilibrium
An equilibrium consists of a sequence of value functions v (a; i; j; x; y; t) ; optimal
decision rules a0 (a; i; j; x; y; t) ; c (a; i; j; x; y; t) and ' (a; i; j; x; y; t) ; aggregate vari-
ables K (x; t), L (x; t) and F (x) a measure  (a; i; j; x; y; t) for workers and prices
rk (x; t) ; w (x; t) ; and p (x; t) such that
i. Given prices rk (x; t) ; w (x; t) ; p (x; t) and mass of workers  (a; i; j; x; y; t) ;
the optimal decision rules a0 (a; i; j; x; y; t) ; c (a; i; j; x; y; t) and ' (a; i; j; x; y; t) solve
the workersdynamic problems given by equations (1) and (2) and v (a; i; j; x; y; t)
are resulting value functions.
ii. Given prices rk (x; t) ; w (x; t) ; and p (x; t) ; K (x; t) ; L (x; t) ; and F (x) solve
the rms problem.
iii. There are no arbitrage opportunities. This implies that all assets earn a
common rate of return r (t) ; specically
r (t) = rk (x; t)
and
1 + r (t) =
R (x; t) + p (x; t)
p (x; t  1)
for all x = fR;Pg :
iv. Market clearance
Labor market clearance
LS (x; t) = L (x; t)
for all x = fR;Pg :
Asset market clearance
A (t) =
X
x2fR;Pg
K (x; t) +
X
x2fR;Pg
p (x; t  1)F (x)
10
v. Aggregate resource constraint holds:X
x2fR;Pg
G (K (x; t) ; L (x; t) ; F (x) ;A (x; t)) + (1  )K (t)
=
X
x2fR;Pg
(
JX
j=1
Z
RI
c (a; i; j; x; x; t) d (a; i; j; x; x; t)
+
JX
j=1
Z
RI
c (a; i; j; x; x; t) d (a; i; j; x; x; t)
)
+K (t+ 1)
+
X
x2fR;Pg
JX
j=1
Z
RI
' (a; i; j; x; x; t)md (a; i; j; x; x; t)
vi. Distribution is consistent with workersdecisions:
The mass of population holding asset a 2 B; of type i 2 I; at age j 2 f2; :::; Jg
and who has not migrated yet (x0 = x = y) is provided below
 (B; I; j; x; x; t+ 1)
=
Z
RI
(1  ' (a; i; j   1; x; x; t)) (a0 (a; i; j   1; x; x; t) 2 B) d (a; i; j   1; x; x; t)
where  is the indicator function.
The mass of immigrants (x0 = x 6= y =  x) holding asset a 2 B; of type i 2 I;
at age j 2 f2; :::; Jg is given by
 (B; I; j; x; x; t+ 1)
=
Z
RI
' (a; i; j   1; x; x; t) (a0 (a; i; j   1; x; x; t) 2 B) d (a; i; j   1; x; x; t)
+
Z
RI
 (a0 (a; i; j   1; x; x; t) 2 B) d (a; i; j   1; x; x; t)
Notice that the rst part of the summation in the RHS represents the mass, given
the state, who chooses to migrate in the current period and the second part describes
the mass who has already migrated in previous periods.
1.3 Calibration
Since the aim of this study is to evaluate implications of labor market integration
between Turkey and EU, the model is calibrated to an economy with these countries.
Turkey is the location corresponding to the poor location (P ) in the model while
EU is the rich location (R) : The engagement date is assumed to be 2010 because of
11
data availability.9
Parameters are either taken from Klein and Ventura (2009) or calibrated by
using their calibration strategy.10 Table 1 provides the list of parameters used in
the current paper. The length of a period in the model economy is 5 years. Workers
are assumed to enter the model at age 20 and die at the age of 70 years, so they live
for 12 periods implying that J = 12:
Population As mentioned in Section 1.2.1 the population in the model economy
is normalized to 1. Local population shares before migration are calculated using
Penn World Tables, version 8.1. They are 0.15 for Turkey and 0.85 for the EU in
2010. Moreover, for each location I assume that population growth is zero suggesting
that the population for each age group is equal to Nx(t)
J
.
Technology In both locations production technologies are assumed to be iden-
tical. It is a Cobb-Douglas production technology with labor, capital and land.
Income shares of these production factors and depreciation rate are taken from
Klein and Ventura (2009).11 As they did, I assume that income shares of each
production factor are equal across locations and they are 0.632 for labor, 0.317 for
capital and 0.051 for land. Depreciation rate is equal to 0.081. Similarly, land per
worker (F (x) =N (x; t)) before migration is normalized to 1. I calibrate TFP ratio
of EU to Turkey (A (R) =A (P )) to match the ratio of output per capita in the EU
to output per capita in Turkey (yR=yP ) which is equal to 2.27 for the benchmark
year. The target is calculated using real GDP and population data provided in Penn
World Tables, version 8.1. Aggregate output per capita for the EU is calculated by
weighting each member countrys real GDP per capita ratio with their population
shares.
Preferences Workers are assumed to have CRRA utility with  = 2.  is
calibrated to match annual K=Y ratio in each location. K=Y ratios are equal in
both locations due to the assumption of equal production factor income shares across
locations for each factor. The targeted annual K=Y ratio is taken from Klein and
Ventura (2009) and it is equal to 2.18.12
Skills It is assumed that skill distributions across ages (skill-age prole) in both
locations are the same, yet skill levels di¤er. In this regard, e¢ ciency units of
labor can be written as e (j; y) = e(j)h (y) ; y 2 fR;Pg : The rst term of the
9The latest data provided by Barro-Lee on educational attainment, which is used for the
calculation of e¢ ciency units of labor, is for 2010.
10One of the quantitative exercises in Klein and Ventura (2009) is the enlargement of European
Economic Area in 2004 with the participation of Eastern Europe countries.
11These parameters are calculated by using the US data and also used for the EU enlargement
exercise in Klein and Ventura (2009).
12It is calculated by using the US data in Klein and Ventura (2009).
12
multiplication represents skill-age prole of a worker which is assumed to be the
same in both locations. The second term is the average educational attainment in
location y. For this variable educational attainment data provided in Barro-Lee data
set is used. e(j) is calculated by interpolating skill-age prole provided in Hansen
(1993) for six age groups.13
Migration costs In the benchmark economy the resource moving cost, m; is
prohibitively high that there is no migration. The e¢ ciency cost of moving, ; is
taken from Klein and Ventura (2009). Two values are used for  which are 0 and
0:15, so two benchmark economies calculated.
The benchmark economy is not a¤ected by the distribution of utility cost of
moving. However, since it is the same both in the benchmark economy and in
the alternative economy where migration is possible, it is useful to mention its
calibration in this section. Utility cost of moving is assumed to be drawn exponential
distribution with parameter : This parameter is calibrated to match the emigration
rate in the rst 25 years after removal of barriers. Two values of  are calibrated,
low and high. For the low parameter, which means low cost, the target is 1% per
year on average while it is 0:5% per year on average for the high parameter, and it
corresponds to high cost. These targets which are used in Klein and Ventura (2009)
are set with respect to historical migration data for Europe and North America.
13Second order polynomial interpolation is applied.
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1.4 Quantitative Analysis
The aim of this paper is to study the quantitative implications of labor market
integration between the EU and Turkey. In the current papers setup labor market
integration occurs after either removal or decline of resource cost of moving. For
this purpose, in this section, rst I study the long-run implications of the decline
in resource moving cost on aggregates; then, I explore its transitional implications
on aggregates; and nally, I conclude the quantitative analysis by investigating its
transitional implications on welfare of natives of both locations.
1.4.1 Steady-State Implications on Aggregates
In this section, the long-run e¤ects of removing barriers to labor mobility are
investigated. Two steady states are compared. In the benchmark steady state the
resource cost of moving is so high that there is no movement between Turkey and the
EU. In the second steady state this cost is unexpectedly removed, fully and partially,
and migration between these locations becomes possible. Steady state analysis is
made for three cases. Cases di¤erentiate regarding values of resource cost of moving,
m. In the rst case m is fully removed, in the second case m is equal to half of the
annual per capita output in Turkey, and in the last case it is equal to the annual per
capita output in Turkey. For each value of m; e¤ects of skill cost on migration is
investigated for two levels of skill losses. Table 2 presents results of these exercises
for both locations and for the region.
After the change in barriers to labor mobility, a large amount of Turkish pop-
ulation migrates to the EU. For di¤erent values of m, the population share of EU
after migration increases to a range between 96.3% and 99.9% from 84.7%. A mass
of migration at this range generates an increase in regional capital and output. The
range of regional capital increase is between 6% and 8% whilst it is between 6.2%
and 8% for the regional output. These variables rise more for lower values of m
suggesting that increase in regional output and capital is higher for larger amounts
of migration to the EU.
Likewise, the amount of capital and output in the EU rise after migration. The
increase is between 12.4% and 16.5% for capital and 12.6% and 16.5% for output.
However, migration generates a decrease in these variables in Turkey. The decreases
in capital and output in Turkey are at similar amounts and they change between
73.5% and 98.9%. Although there is a large amount of output decrease for each
case, output per worker increases in Turkey at range 11%-43.7%. This nding
15
suggests that population decreases more than output in Turkey and this implication
is not surprising due to the production technology with decreasing return to labor.
Contrary to a large increase in per capita output in Turkey, the output per worker
in the EU decreases. However the loss is small and varies between 1.04% and 1.23%.
Besides, in both locations the change in output per worker gets smaller as migration
costs increase.
Although TFP disparity and labor quality di¤erences across the EU and Turkey
are the main driving forces generating these results, there is also a general equilib-
rium e¤ect induced by free movement of capital which has an additional contribution
to these results. Because of CRS production technology, migration leads to an in-
crease in marginal product of capital but a decrease in that of labor in the EU. The
former makes the EU more attractive for capital while the latter reduces the wage
gap between locations. However, free movement of capital decelerates the decline
in marginal product of labor in the EU and induce a long-lasting migration period
compared to the case where there is no free movement of capital. Consequently, free
movement of capital amplies the volume of migration, thus the amount of output
change in each location and in the region.
Also notice that when there are no skill losses, levels of change in m have negli-
gible e¤ects on results while their impact di¤erentiate quantitatively in the presence
of skill losses. This implies that when there is no skill loss the values of m used
in this paper are not so high relative to the initial wage gap across locations, so
changes in m values do not a¤ect the volume of migration. However, the presence of
a skill loss repress the wage gap across locations and makes the migration decision
more sensitive to the change in levels of m:
The last thing that I want to mention in this section is that the steady state
outcomes of decline inm are independent of utility cost of moving distribution. This
is because of the assumption that zero is in the support of this costs distribution.
In the benchmark steady state m is prohibitively high that there is no migration, so
the distribution of utility cost has no e¤ect in the benchmark economy. On the other
hand, alternative economy is reached after migration and the potential migrants in
this economy are only the ones whose utility cost is zero, so similarly the alternative
economy is independent of utility cost distribution.
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1.4.2 Transitional Implications on Aggregates
Historical data on past migrations in the EU and the US, provided in Klein and
Ventura (2009), shows that migration is gradual over time. In line with the data, the
model in this paper also generates a gradual labor movement due to heterogenous
psychic moving cost and nite lives assumptions after the decline in resource cost
of moving. Similarly, borrowing constraint which does not allow workers to move
with debt has an additional impact on gradualness of labor movement. Because
of gradual labor movement transitional implications of migration di¤ers from its
steady-state implications. Thus, in this section the model is used to explore these
transitional implications of the decline in resource cost of moving. For this exercise,
the economy is initially assumed to be at the benchmark steady state where m is
so high that there is no migration. Then, unexpectedly resource cost of moving is
partially removed and migration starts. The rst period of transition is assumed
to be the period at which resource cost of moving is partially removed. So, in
this period there is no migration and, aggregates and prices, except land price, are
the same with their counterparts in the benchmark steady state. Moreover, before
migration all of the land in each location is assumed to be held by residents. Also, it
is assumed that TFP levels of each location do not change across time by migration.
Quantication of transitional implications of migration is made only for the case
3 with  = 0:15 in the steady state analysis (see Table 2). In this casem is decreased
to annual per capita output in Turkey and this is the case where the long-run gains
in regional output and capital is the lowest among cases reported in the current
paper.14 Tables 3 and 4 display, respectively, changes in EU population and changes
in regional output over time after the decline inm: Results are reported for 10 years,
15 years and 25 years after the decline in m: Since the distribution of utility cost of
moving inuence transitional dynamics of migration, results are presented both for
high and low psychic costs.
As expected, the increase in EU population and the gains in regional output are
larger along transition when psychic costs are low. In spite of these di¤erences in
gains across time, both economies reach to the same steady state. This implies that
economy converges to the new steady state faster when psychic costs are lower.
Another nding is that the growth rate of output gets larger across time while
that of migration rate to the EU gets smaller. The migration from Turkey is large
14For the transitional analysis, case 3 in Table 2 with  = 0:15 is chosen for computational
simplicity. As resource moving cost decreases, migration amount increases, and given other costs,
this raises the number of transition periods to reach the new steady state. An increase in the
number of transition periods means an increase in the size of the state variable t and this raises
the computational burden.
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Table 3: Population change in EU (%)
Economy 10 years 25 years 50 years
High psychic costs 1:20 2:11 3:57
Low psychic costs 2:41 4:11 6:52
Note: This table reports immigration rate in the EU 10 years,
25 years and 50 years after the decline in m to the level of
annual GDP per capita in Turkey. Results are reported for
high and low psychic costs.
just after the resource moving cost decline and it continues across time but with
a decreasing trend. After 10 years the population change in the EU is 1.20% for
high psychic cost and 2.41% for low psychic cost. After 50 years, they increase
by less than three times, and changes are respectively 3.57% and 6.52%. Average
population growth rates per year are 0.12% for the rst 10 years, 0.08% for the rst
25 years and 0.07% for the rst 50 years after the decline when psychic costs are
high. These rates are, respectively, 0.24%, 0.16% and 0.13% when psychic costs are
low. The main reason for this decreasing trend is the change in wage gap between
locations over time. At the time of resource moving cost change, the wage gap across
location is at its highest level. So there are many Turkish natives who choose to
move, even the ones with high psychic moving cost, and this continues for several
periods. However, since the wage gap decreases as population increases in the EU
and decreases in Turkey, migration decelerates overtime. Even Turkish residents
with low psychic moving cost do not move.
Table 4: Regional output change (%)
Economy 10 years 25 years 50 years
High psychic costs 0:03 0:14 0:49
Low psychic costs 0:13 0:26 0:96
Note: This table reports output growth rate in the region
10 years, 25 years and 50 years after the decline in m to
the level of annual GDP per capita in Turkey. Results are
reported for high and low psychic costs.
On the other hand, after migration starts growth rates of regional output raise
over time. Migration a¤ects the regional output by changing the labor supply across
locations, notably in the more productive one, that is the EU. Its impact on the labor
supply in EU occurs through three channels: i. mass of migrants, ii. educational
attainment gap across locations and iii. skill loss of migrants. Mass of migrants is
large just after the removal of barriers but decreases across time due to decreasing
migration rate. So its increasing e¤ect on labor supply decelerates along transition.
However, the impact of educational attainment gap and skill loss of migrants on
labor supply becomes more e¤ective in the long-run. It is because these factors
impacts become visible through descendants of Turkish immigrants. Children of
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Turkish immigrants are born with the human capital of European natives which is
larger than that of their peers in Turkey because of higher educational attainment
in the EU. Moreover, skill loss that Turkish immigrants are subject to disappears
with immigrantsdescendants. These e¤ects lead to an additional increase in labor
supply in the long-run, thus capital accumulation and hence output increase in the
EU. This additional increase grows across time as the share of Turkish newborns in
the EU raises. Consequently, growth rates of regional output get larger over time.
10 years after the decrease in labor mobility cost, the regional output increases by
0.03% for high psychic cost and by 0.13% for low psychic costs. After 50 years, they
grow more than seven times and regional output increases by 0.49% when psychic
costs are low and by 0.96% when psychic costs are high. Average annual growth
rates make more clear this non-stationary growth rate trends. For high psychic costs
average annual growth rates continually get larger across time. It is 0.003% for the
rst 10 years, 0.006% for the rst 25 years and 0.010% for the rst 50 years after
the decline of resource moving cost. But when psychic costs are low these rates are,
respectively, 0.013%, 0.010% and 0.019%. A lower average output growth rate per
year for the rst 25 years compared to the rst 10 years when psychic costs are low
imply that the e¤ect of mass of migrants on labor supply is large and dominant for
the rst 10 years but its e¤ect declines after 10 years decreasing the average annual
growth rate. However, a larger average growth rate per year for the rst 50 years
show that the other two factorsimpact dominates the e¤ect of decreasing mass of
migrants in the long-run.
1.4.3 Transitional Implications on Welfare
In this section, I examine welfare implications of partial removal of resource
moving cost for natives of EU and Turkey. As in section 1.4.2, welfare analysis
is done for the transition from the benchmark economy to an alternative economy
where resource moving cost is decreased to the level of annual GDP per capita in
Turkey and skill loss, ; is 0.15.
Denote the date of the decline in resource moving cost as t0, so at t0   1 the
economy is in the benchmark steady state. Then, given his state (a; i; j; x; y; t) ;
a workers welfare is measured as a consumption equivalent. In other words, it
is a consumption compensation which is necessary to make the worker indi¤erent
between the benchmark steady state and alternative economy in period t: Given
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functional forms in the model, consumption compensation is obtained as
(a; i; j; x; y = x; t) =

v (a; i; j; x; y; t)
v (a; i; j; x; y = x; t0   1)
1=(1 )
  1
Notice that v (a; i; j; x; y = x; t0   1) is the value function of the worker at state
(a; i; j; x; y = x) in the benchmark steady state while v (a; i; j; x; y; t) is his value
function in the transition period t:
Table 5 presents welfare gains as an average of this consumption compensation
across workers regarding their asset holdings, types, and current locations. In other
words, welfare gains are reported as an average across workers for a given birth
location, i.e. independent of workersmigration status, and for a given generation,
i.e. for a given j and t.15 Generation 1 represents the oldest worker (j = 12) at
t = t0 while generation 12 is the group of newborns (j = 1) at t = t0.
Before analyzing welfare implications for di¤erent generations and nationalities,
it would be useful to summarize welfare changing forces at work as of the date that
migration starts. First, remember that since the marginal product of labor in the
EU is higher than its counterpart in Turkey due to its higher level of TFP, the
direction of migration is from Turkey to the EU. As a result of this movement, the
marginal product of labor in EU decreases while it increases in Turkey. This has a
negative e¤ect on welfare for natives of EU while positive e¤ect for natives of Turkey
who choose to stay in Turkey. Meanwhile, natives of Turkey who choose to migrate
benet from higher wage rate in the EU which non-surprisingly has an increasing
e¤ect on their welfare. Migration has also welfare implications through changes in
land price. It increases in the EU due to an increase in future marginal product of
land in this location and decreases in Turkey in the same manner. These changes
in land prices raise welfare of workers holding land in the EU while decrease welfare
of land holders in Turkey.
At time t0 there is no migration, it starts one period after the change. So at this
time there are no changes in aggregates and prices but land price. It increases in the
EU while decreases in Turkey. The impact of land price on welfare is more e¤ective
compared to the impact of wage for the rst couple of generations. This result can
be seen from Table 5. Generation 1 and 6 of natives of the EU have welfare gains due
to increased land price while the same generations of natives of Turkey are exposed
to welfare losses as a result of decline in land price. However, as time passes and
the population in the EU increases, natives of the EU are subject to welfare losses.
Concurrently, welfare of natives of Turkey rise with migration. Natives who migrate
benet from higher wages in the EU and natives who choose to stay in Turkey
15Notice that generation = t+ (J   j) :
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benet from increasing wages in Turkey. Overall, decreasing resource moving cost
increases welfare of natives of Turkey, particularly for young ones. On the other
hand, it leads to a welfare loss for young natives of EU which is relatively small.
Table 5: Welfare gain (%)
Natives of EU Natives of Turkey
Generation Low costs High costs Low costs High costs
1 0:13 0:05  2:05  1:06
6 0:11 0:07  0:49  0:23
12  0:13  0:08 2:04 1:06
24  0:61  0:39 4:67 2:51
Note: This table reports, separately, welfare gains of natives of EU and
natives of Turkey for generations 1, 6, 12 and 24 after a decline in m
to the level of annual GDP per capita in Turkey. Results are reported
for low and high psychic costs.
1.5 Conclusion
There are very few papers that explore economic implications of labor market
integration between Turkey and the EU in a quantitative general equilibrium setup.
Besides, none of them endogenize migration decision after a labor market integration.
This is the rst paper that studies economic implications of labor market integration
between Turkey and the EU in a general equilibrium setup where migration decision
is endogenous. Labor market integration means lifting fully or partially barriers to
labor mobility across Turkey and the EU. This might happen as a result of either
EU membership or an engagement which only ensures a labor market integration.
So the counterfactual analysis I made in this paper by lifting these barriers does
not consider other implications of Turkish accession to the EU but labor market
integration.
Findings of this paper shed light on economic gains and losses in the region and,
separately, in each location after an eventual labor market integration and how they
change across time. There is an output increase in the region and in the EU but
a decrease in Turkey as a result of a large mass of migration from Turkey to the
EU. Nevertheless, welfare of Turkish young natives increases in return for negligible
welfare losses for young natives in the EU.
This paper does not consider convergence of Turkeys productivity to EUs pro-
ductivity level in the long-run which may potentially a¤ect the endogenous labor
movement in the region, so its e¤ect on output and welfare. Moreover, population
distribution di¤erential across these locations in terms of age, i.e. the aging popula-
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tion in the EU and younger population in Turkey, and migrations impact on labor
supply and social security systems in the EU and Turkey in such an environment is
not studied. These issues which have potentially important welfare implications in
both locations are left for future research.
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1.A Appendix: Algorithm
I follow the algorithm provided in Klein and Ventura (2009).
1.A.1 Steady State 1 (Benchmark Economy)
1. Set m so high that there is no migration.
2. Guess aggregate capital, K:
3. Find population (Nx), labor (L
 (x)) and land (F  (x)) in each location.
(a) Since aggregate population N is normalized to 1, population in each
location is equal to population shares of each location obtained from
data. Then assuming that population is equally distributed across ages
and using skill-age prole and educational attainment ratio nd labor in
each location.
(b) Land in each location is equal to its population because, at the initial
steady state land per capita is normalized to 1.
4. Using equality of marginal product of capital in each location, nd capital
ratio of locations, then capital in each location (K (x) for x 2 fR;Pg) in line
with the aggregate capital guess.
5. Find return on assets and prices in each location: r; w (x) ; R (x) ; p (x) :
6. Solve workers problem and nd value functions and policy functions.
7. Using policy functions, calculate distribution of workers,  .
8. Calculate aggregates.
9. If jKnew=K   1j <  stop, otherwise go to step 2 and update the guess.
1.A.2 Steady State 2 (Alternative Economy)
In this economy, di¤erent from the benchmark economy, I need to nd population
of each location after migration, i.e. NP and NR: If I can nd one of them I can nd
the other asN Nx: Following Klein and Ventura (2009), I aim to ndNP : It is going
25
to be found by bisection and the search will be in the following interval
h eNP ; Ni
where eNP is the lowest population possible in the poor location (N lP ) that makes
wage in each location equal, i.e. w (R) = w (P ) : In other words, a population level
where workers are indi¤erent to move. N is the highest population possible (NhP ).
1. Decrease m so that migration between two locations is possible.
2. Find eNP using equality of marginal product of labor in each location and that
of marginal product of capital in each location.
3. Guess N0 2

N lP ; N
h
P

:
4. Find labor (L (x)) in each location which is consistent with N0: Note that
land in each location is the same as in the benchmark economy.
5. Guess aggregate capital, K:
6. Apply steps from 4 to 9 given in the algorithm of the benchmark economy.
7. Check whether there is migration or not in the economy. If there is migration,
this means that wage gap is still so high that residents in poor location still
want to move to rich location, so lower the upper bound of the population
interval in the poor location and set NhP = N0: If there is no migration raise
the lower bound and set N lP = N0: Return to step 3.
8. Continue till NhP and N
l
P converge to each other.
1.A.3 Transition
By transition I mean departing from the benchmark economy with the decrease
in resource cost moving and reaching several periods after to the alternative economy.
So, to solve for the transition rst I need to set the number of periods, T , to reach
the second steady state. Then the procedure works as follows:
1. Guess K (t) and L (x; t) for x 2 fR;Pg and for t 2 f1; 2; :::Tg :
2. Using equality of marginal product of capital in each location, nd capital
ratio of locations, then capital in each location (K (x; t) for x 2 fR;Pg) for
t 2 f1; 2; :::Tg :
3. Find return on assets and prices in each location: r (t) ; w (x; t) ; R (x; t) ; p (x; t)
for x 2 fR;Pg and for t 2 f1; 2; :::Tg :
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4. Solve workers problem and nd value functions and policy functions for t 2
f1; 2; :::Tg.
5. Using policy functions, calculate distribution of workers,  (t) for t 2 f1; 2; :::Tg :
6. Calculate aggregates for t 2 f1; 2; :::Tg.
7. If max (jKnew (t) =K (t)  1j) <  and max (jLnew (x; t) =L (x; t)  1j) < 
for x 2 fR;Pg stop, otherwise go to step 1 and update guesses.
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CHAPTER 2
THE ROLE OF FINANCIAL DEVELOPMENT IN THE RISE OF
RESIDUAL WAGE INEQUALITY
2.1 Introduction
In the US, residual wage inequality -that is wage dispersion within worker groups
having similar observable characteristics like gender, age, education- increases since
late 1960s. This increase goes in parallel with the rise in overall wage inequality.
Figure 1, replicated by using data provided in Heathcote, Perri, Violante (2010),
shows the variance of log male wages between 1967 and 2005. The straight line
represents overall wage inequality while the line with circles shows residual wage
inequality.16 Throughout the period, the rst rises by 74% and the second increases
by 62%. Heathcote, Perri, Violante (2010) presents that the residual wage inequal-
ity increase explains almost all of the increase in the overall wage inequality during
1970s, but it explains two third of the overall increase since 1980s. Although ob-
servable worker characteristics gain importance in the explanation of overall wage
inequality increase by 1980s, rise in residual wage inequality has still a signicant
share in the overall increase. It accounts for 70% of the overall inequality increase
for the whole period. Thus it is important to examine forces leading to a rise in
residual wage inequality.
This paper questions only the role of nancial development in the residual wage
inequality increase in the US. An incomplete-market model in which homogeneous
16For both of the series Heathcote, Perri, Violante (2010) uses CPS data and their sample
includes households in which the head is male, and in which there are either one or two adults
of age 2560. Residual wage inequality is measured as the variance of error term obtained in the
estimation of log hourly wages on observable worker demographics. The observable variables that
are controlled for in the regression are race dummies, sex dummies, education dummies, average
years of education for all adults, a quadratic in age both for the head and non-head, number of
household members below age 25, number of household members above age 60.
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Source: Heathcote, Perri, Violante (2010)
Figure 1: Variance of log male wages
workers work in rms possessing heterogeneous investment e¢ ciency is used to an-
swer this question. In this setup, rms are the main actors that transmit changes in
nancial market to residual wage distribution. In the presence of frictions in both
nancial and labor market, a change in rm distribution with respect to capital-
labor ratio driven by nancial development is the key issue that potentially brings
a change in residual wage inequality. Financial development corresponds to an in-
crease in rmsaccess to nance. After an easing in access to nance, rms which
have an e¢ cient investment technology but which are lack of funding are able to
borrow more, invest more and hence accumulate more capital compared to rms
having ine¢ cient investment technology.17 The presence of labor market frictions
limit these rms to adjust their number of employees in response to the increase in
their capital holdings. So, it is expected that rm distribution regarding capital-
labor ratio increases. Under an assumption of wage setting as a rent sharing rule,
this increase in capital-labor distribution presumably generates an increase in wage
dispersion.18
Briey, in the mechanism described above there are two main stages : nancial
development leads to an increase in capital-labor ratio dispersion and increase in
capital-labor ratio dispersion creates an increase in residual wage inequality. The
data on nancial development and capital-labor dispersion encourage me to explore
17Empirical evidence supports rms use of external nance for investment funding. Ajello
(2015) and Zetlin-Jones and Shouridesh (2014) provide that in the US almost 20% of aggregate
investment by public rms is nanced by external funding. Zetlin-Jones and Shouridesh (2014) also
shows that the ratio is similar in UK for investment by public rms while it is 80% for investment
by private rms.
18Wage setting by rent sharing implies that larger and more productive rms pay higher wages.
This prediction is in line with evidence establishing positive correlation between rm size and wages
(Oi and Idson (1999)) and between rm productivity and wages (Van Reenen (1996), Mortensen
(2003)).
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Source: Board of Governors of Federal Reserve System, FoF
(A) Share of Credits in Non-Financial Assets (%)
Source: World Bank, Global Financial Database
(B) Credit/Capital Expenses (%)
Figure 2: Financial development
my question through such a mechanism whereas they both increase along the pe-
riod where residual wage inequality increase is observed. In the literature, nancial
development is commonly captured by an increase in credit-capital ratio. Figure
2 displays the change in private credit-capital ratio in the US between 1967 and
2010. The graph on the left hand side is constructed by using non-nancial corpo-
rate sector balance sheets provided under Flow of Funds tables. The graph on the
right hand side presents ratio of private credit by deposit money banks and other
nancial institutions to GDP, which is obtained from World Bank Global Financial
Database.19 Both graphs show that credit-capital ratio increased over the period
that residual wage inequality increase is observed. Figure 3 shows the variance of
log capital-labor ratio. The series which are built-up using Compustat data display
that capital-labor dispersion of publicly traded rms increased, notably after mid-
90s. Leonardi (2007) documents a similar increase in capital-labor dispersion in the
US. Besides, he provides some empirical evidence of a positive correlation between
the dispersion of capital-labor ratio and residual wage inequality.20
It is worth to note that I do not claim the only reason for the increase in residual
wage inequality is nancial development. Yet, my aim is to provide its quantitative
impact on the residual wage inequality increase. In order to study this quantita-
tive question, I adopt an incomplete-markets model with labor and nancial market
frictions. There are no aggregate shocks in the model economy. Labor market
frictions are standard Diamond-Mortensen-Pissarides search and matching frictions
(Pissarides (2000)). It makes rmslabor adjustment costly and limit labor move-
19This ratio is adjusted by capital-output ratio targeted in the current paper and transformed
to credit-capital ratio.
20This relationship is clear for male, but unclear for female (possible reason is a large change in
labor force participation). The evidence for male shows a signicant impact at the upper part of
the male residual wage dispersion and an insignicant impact at the lower part of the distribution
These results are hold for two periods studied: 1973-1987 and 1988-2002.
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Source: Compustat (Agriculture, Forestry, Fishing, Hunting; Finance
and Insurance; Real Estate, Rental and Leasing sectors are eliminated.)
Figure 3: Log capital-labor ratio
ment, thus prevent to have a unique marginal product of labor in the economy.
Following the standard search models wages are assumed to be set by Nash bargain-
ing. Financial market frictions are Kiyotaki-Moore (1997, 2012) type borrowing con-
straints that limit rmsborrowing up to a constant share of their capital holdings.
Financial development means an increase in this constant share implying a looser
borrowing constraint. In other words, rms can borrow more with the same amount
of collateral or borrow the same amount with less collateral.21 In the model, at each
period rms are subject to an idiosyncratic shock to their investment technology
rendering rms heterogeneous in terms of investment e¢ ciency. Cost of investment
is less for rms having high investment e¢ ciency compared to rms having less ef-
ciency. I follow Wang and Wen (2013) in the aforementioned rm heterogeneity
setting. Moreover, I assume there is an exogenous entry and exit of rms à la Khan
and Thomas (2013) at each period. The mass of entrants are the same with that of
exiting rms, keeping the number of rms stationary. In this setup, after nancial
development, rms having high investment e¢ ciency can invest more by borrowing
more, thus accumulate more capital compared to less e¢ cient rms. Since there
are frictions in the labor market, labor cannot move so that all rms have the same
capital-labor ratio. Hence, capital-labor dispersion is anticipated to increase after -
21In an environment with nancial frictions which limit rmsborrowing because of collateral
requirement, an increase in private credit to capital ratio might be due to: (i) an increase in
rmscapital holdings which are used as collateral in borrowing; (ii) the fact that rms are not
borrowing constrained previously (i.e. their borrowing constraints do not bind) so they are able to
increase their credit use; (iii) a decrease in the amount of collateral demanded implying a decrease
in cost of borrowing. In my framework the last reason means an easing in access to nance.
Unfortunately, there is no work for the US that searches for the reason of an increase in credit to
capital ratio. However, Liberti and Mian (2010) shows that nancial development (private credit
to GDP) decreases both collateralization rate and collateral spread in 15 developing countries.
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nancial development. Because of wage setting with Nash bargaining, this increase in
capital-labor dispersion is conceivably translated to wage dispersion. Consequently,
residual wage inequality increases.
It is important to note that an improvement in investment technologies after
nancial development is not considered in the current paper; i.e. e¢ ciency levels
of investment technology are the same before and after nancial development. In
addition, in this paper I limit myself to quantify the change in wage dispersion
driven by a change in rm distribution, so I abstract from modelling worker side by
assuming hand-to-mouth workers. Therefore, I ignore workersbehavioral responses
to nancial development, which would a¤ect their asset holdings and change their
outside option during bargaining process as discussed in Krusell et al. (2010). Nev-
ertheless, Krusell et al. (2010) shows that the e¤ect of workerswealth on wages
is very slight for most asset levels, when wealth di¤ers among workers only due to
past employment luck.
I calibrate the model to the US economy. Benchmark economy corresponds to
pre-nancial development economy and is calibrated to 1974Q1-1979Q4. Then I
counterfactually loose rmsborrowing constraints by rising their parameter value
by an amount equal to the increase in aggregate credit-capital ratio between pre-
nancial development period and post-nancial development period. Post-nancial
development period is 2001Q1-2007Q4.
Findings of this analysis show that after nancial development, variance of wages
increases by 2.8% while that of capital-labor ratio increases by 25.2% However,
contrary to my expectations, they both decrease at the log-level; the variance of
log-wages decreases by 8.6% and that of log capital-labor ratio decreases by 8.7%.
Changes in mass of rms with respect to capital, and labor, which are the main
components of wages, give some insights about these results. After nancial devel-
opment, the share of rms holding large amounts of capital increases in the economy.
In other words, rm distribution with respect to capital shifts right and becomes
left-skewed, implying that nancial development generates overall improvement in
the economy. On the other hand, rm distribution in terms of labor stays almost
the same. Consequently, changes in the distribution of capital-labor ratio and wage
is ruled by the change in rm distribution regarding capital. Variance of capital
increases by 26.4% while variance of log-capital decreases by 6.2% generating in-
creases in variances of capital-labor ratio and wages while declines in their log-level
counterparts.
Related Literature
This paper is related to the literature which explores residual wage inequality
increase in the US. Previous studies that examine causes of residual wage inequality
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increase can be roughly classied in two groups: the rst group explains the increase
through unobservable worker characteristics while the second explains it by change in
rm distribution regarding various variables. Within each group, main mechanisms
which generate residual wage inequality increase are similar, but initial driving forces
are di¤erent. The current paper can be classied under the second group where
nancial development is the driving force leading to a change in rm distribution
regarding capital-labor ratio and hence to a change in residual wage inequality.
In the rst group of study, skilled-biased technological change (SBTC hereinafter)
is the most commonly proposed driving-force for the rise in residual wage inequality
(also in overall wage inequality). According to this point of view, SBTC leads to
an increase in demand for both observable and unobservable skill, thus induces an
increase in return to skills (Juhn, Murphy, Pierce (1993), Galor and Moav (2000),
Acemoglu (2002))22. Yet, Lemieux (2006) claims that the reason for the increase in
residual wage inequality changes over time. For early 1980s, decrease in real value
of minimum wages and de-unionization leads to an increase in residual wage in-
equality. And after mid-1980s, the change in labor force composition -that is rising
education and experience- which induces an increase in dispersion of unobservable
skills accounts for the increase in residual inequality. So, he claims that if this com-
positional change is controlled then there is no increase in residual wage inequality
after 1980s. However, Autor et al. (2008) claims that residual wage inequality con-
tinues to increase after 1980s in the upper tail of the distribution (90/50), while
it slows down in the lower tail (50/10). They a¢ rm that the increase in residual
inequality is explained by a richer version of SBTC, namely asymmetric SBTC. Ac-
cordingly, information technology complements high education workers engaged in
high-education tasks, substitutes for moderately educated workers in routine tasks,
and has less impact on low-skilled workers performing routine tasks. Therefore,
asymmetric SBTC increases demand for observable and unobservable skills for high
education workers leading to an increase in return to skills for this group. Hence,
inequality increases with SBTC in the upper tail of residual wage distribution.
On the other hand, the main idea in the second group of work is that wage
inequality among similar workers stems from rm heterogeneity. Consequently, an
increase in rm heterogeneity leads to an increase in residual wage inequality. In
Helpman et al. (2010), trade liberalization is the reason for an increase in rm
heterogeneity which generates residual wage inequality increase. In their setup,
rms are heterogenous in terms of productivity and after trade liberalization more
productive rms benet more from trade and increase more their revenues compared
to the less productive rms. So, this leads to an increase in rm heterogeneity
22These articles are among the mostly referred articles on this subject. See the literature review
in Autor et al. (2008) to see other articles on this strand.
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in terms of revenues, and in the presence of Diamond-Mortensen-Pissarides labor
market frictions and wage setting with Nash bargaining this generates a residual
wage inequality increase. In Leonardi (2007), decrease in capital prices accounts for
an increase in rm heterogeneity in terms of capital-labor ratio. Similarly, in the
presence of Diamond-Mortensen-Pissarides labor market frictions and wages setting
with rent sharing, increase in capital labor ratio leads to residual wage inequality
increase. The mechanism provided in Leonardi (2007) is the most relevant one to
the mechanism described in the current paper.
Another most relevant work is Jerzmanowski and Nabar (2013). It is, to the best
of my knowledge, the rst and the sole paper that explores nancial development
as a source of residual wage inequality increase in the US, but only among skilled
workers. Although they suggest the same driving force as in the current paper, the
mechanism that they formulate is totally di¤erent from the one built up in this paper
and it can not be classied under neither of groups documented above.23 Moreover,
they do not bring their model to the data, however numerical simulation is done and
shown that residual wage inequality increases by rising matching e¢ ciency up to a
certain level, then it starts to decrease. Additionally, they empirically show that
nancial deregulation in 1980s in the US increase standard deviation of residual
wages by 1.7% between 1977 and 2006.24
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2.2 presents the model.
Section 2.3 describes the parameterization of the benchmark economy. Section 2.4
explores the e¤ect of nancial development on the model economy. Section 2.5
concludes.
23They scrutinize their question using an endogenous growth model with imperfect capital
markets and two sectors, i.e. manufacturing and innovation sector. Both sectors employ skilled
workers while the rst one also employs unskilled worker. In the manufacturing sector, there are
some skilled workers who have a good idea to enter and start to produce in the innovation sector,
but who are lack of nance. Financial market provides external nance to these skilled workers to
enter and produce in the innovation sector. Financial market frictions are modeled as a search and
matching process between skilled workers with potential ideas and nancial intermediaries with
capital. So, nancial development means more e¢ cient matching technology. In this framework
residual wage inequality is the wage inequality between skilled workers working in the manufac-
turing sector and skilled workers working in the innovation sector. Note that, wage in innovation
sector is larger than that in manufacturing sector. After nancial development, more skilled work-
ers with a good idea match with nancial intermediaries and have access to external nance which
makes them to enter the innovation sector. Consequently, residual wage inequality increase among
skilled workers.
24The empirical analysis in Jerzmanowski and Nabar (2013) has two steps: rst, they nd resid-
ual wage time series by regressing logarithm of weekly real wage on observable worker characteris-
tics; second, they regress logarithm of the standard deviation of residuals on nancial development
variable.
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2.2 The Model
2.2.1 Environment
The model economy is a discrete time, innite horizon economy without aggre-
gate shocks. The focus is on stationary equilibrium. The economy consists of a unit
measure of rms and a unit measure of workers distributed uniformly over [0; 1].
Workers are homogenous and they play a little role in the model, i.e. only their
value functions are needed in wage determination. So, they do not solve a problem.
They inelastically supply labor at each period and they consume what they earn.
They do not save or lend.
Firms produce with identical production technology using capital and labor.
They own capital but hire labor. They are heterogenous with respect to e¢ ciency
of their investment technology. Firmsobjective is the same with that of their entre-
preneurs. So, in what follows, "rms" and "entrepreneurs" are used interchangeably.
In each period, a constant share of rms hit by an exogenous exit shock and the same
amount of rms enter to the market keeping the number of rms in the economy
stationary.
Firms and workers meet and match in a labor market with standard Diamond-
Mortensen-Pissarides search and matching frictions (detailed later). However, dif-
ferent from the standard search and matching literature I assume risk-averse en-
trepreneurs. There is a frictional nancial market à la Kiyotaki-Moore (1997), i.e.
rms can borrow up to a constant share of their future level of capital holdings.
2.2.2 Labor Market
Firms and workers randomly match in a frictional labor market. Firms are
large in the sense that each employs possibly many workers. They participate in
the labor market without any cost. However, in order to hire workers they post
vacancies which is costly. Workers can be either employed or unemployed. Only
unemployed workers search for a job; i.e. no on the job search. There is no cost
for unemployed workers to participate in the labor market. Workers inelastically
supply labor, so the labor force participation rate is 1.
Vacant jobs match randomly with unemployed workers. The aggregate matching
function, M(Ut;VAC t); represents the number of matches in a period when there
are Ut unemployed workers and VAC t vacancies in the economy. As it is standard
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in the search and matching literature, matching function is concave, homogenous of
degree one and increasing in both terms. It is specied as
M(Ut;VAC t) = U

t VAC
1 
t
where  represents the matching e¢ ciency and  is the elasticity of the matching
function.
The probability that a vacancy is lled in the current period is qt and it is equal
to M(Ut;VAC t)=VAC t = M (Ut=VAC t; 1) = M (1=t; 1) where t VAC t=Ut is the
labor market tightness. Similarly, the probability that an unemployed worker nds
a job is ft and it is equal to M(Ut;VAC t)=Ut = tqt: Notice that both qt and ft
are functions of t; q (t) decreases with t while f (t) increases. In the rest of the
paper, for notational simplicity, I will use qt instead of q (t) and ft instead of f (t).
In each period, with probability ; an exogenous job separation shock occurs
and an employed worker becomes unemployed. Workers who have lost their job
participate in labor market one period after they become unemployed. So they are
unemployed at least one period and earn unemployment benet which is less than
wage, implying that matching is also costly for unemployed workers.
Since matching process is costly for both rms and workers, a realized job match
yields a surplus. Following standard Diamond-Mortensen-Pissarides setup it is as-
sumed that this surplus is shared by Nash bargaining. In other words, wages are
determined by Nash bargaining and it will be detailed in wage setting section.
2.2.3 Firms
Preferences and technology There is a continuum of rms which are uni-
formly distributed over [0; 1] : The objective of a rm is to maximize its entrepre-
neurs utility. Entrepreneurs are risk-averse and they maximize
1X
t=0
t ln (ct)
where ct is entrepreneurs consumption in period t.
Firms behave competitively in goods market and all produce identical homoge-
nous goods using constant return to scale production technology with capital and
labor,
yt = k

t n
1 
t
Firms own capital but hire labor in a frictional labor market.
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Capital adjustments Firms accumulate capital by investing. As in Wang
and Wen (2013), they are heterogenous with respect to e¢ ciency level of their in-
vestment technology. E¢ ciency levels are determined by idiosyncratic investment
specic-technology shock, z; that they face every period. Shocks are assumed to be
i:i:d: across time and across rms. Idiosyncratic shock z determines the marginal
e¢ ciency of investment, i. Namely, a rm needs to invest 1
z
units in order to in-
crease its capital by one unit. Firms assumed to have either high (zH) or low (zL)
e¢ ciency level. Every period only a fraction  of rms have high e¢ ciency level of
investment. As capital stock of a rm depreciates at a constant rate ; the law of
motion for capital is given by
kt+1 = ztit + (1  ) kt
where zt 2 fzL; zHg : Note that, the cost of investment is higher for rms having
zL compared to rms with zH : In other words, rms having zH accumulate the
same amount of capital with rms having zL by doing a less amount of investment
compared to those rms.
Investment is assumed to be irreversible, it  0 for each t. Irreversible investment
assumption prevents a rm to have all bargaining power in wage bargaining process
and also di¤erentiates capital from risk-free assets, b:
Labor adjustments As discussed in section 2.2.2, rms open vacancies to hire
workers and vacancy posting is costly. Following Gali and van Rens (2010), I assume
a quadratic vacancy posting cost function which is given by
C (vt) =
1
2
v2t
where vt is the number of vacancy posted by a rm at time t and  is a constant.25
Vacancy is assumed to be non-negative, vt  0. In each period a fraction qt of
vacancies are lled while a fraction  of match is separated due to the job separation
rate. Hence (1  )nt of current periods workers continue to work in the rm while
qtvt of workers are newly hired and start to work in the following period. As a result,
the law of motion for labor is given by
nt+1 = (1  )nt + qtvt
25Gali and van Rens (2010) indicates, by referring to Cooper and Willis (2004), that con-
vex adjustment costs provide a good approximation for the aggregate dynamics for employment.
Moreover, Mortensen (2003) claims that cost function convexity is essential for the existence of
di¤erences in employer productivity in equilibrium where the only production factor is labor. In
my setup, convexity of labor adjustment cost brings further heterogeneity where the main source
of heterogeneity comes from investment e¢ ciency. It also has a limiting e¤ect on opening vacancy
by making frictions higher when higher number of vacancies are opened.
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Credit adjustments All rms have access to bond market. They save by
purchasing bonds (bt > 0) and borrow by issuing bonds (bt < 0) : They are borrowing
constrained; i.e. they can borrow up to a constant share, '; of their capital holdings
of next period, as in Kiyotaki and Moore (1997)
(1 + r) bt+1   'kt+1
where r is the risk-free interest rate on borrowing. I assume small open economy in
the sense that r is taken as given in this setup.
Financial development corresponds to an increase in ': By this increase in ';
rms having high investment e¢ ciency but binding borrowing constraints are able
to access more to external nance to be used in investing. Hence they increase
their capital holdings compared to less e¢ cient rms, and this possibly drives a
rise in heterogeneity of capital holdings among rms. However, labor market fric-
tions limit labor movement from less e¢ cient rms to more e¢ cient rms and this
prevents occurrence of unique marginal product of labor in the economy. Thus
rmsheterogeneity regarding capital-labor ratio is expected to rise after nancial
development.
Entry and exit Every period x of rms are hit by an exit shock, x; and are
replaced by an equal number of rms. Since this is an innite horizon economy,
introducing entry-exit ensures that borrowing continues in the market over time.
If a rm receives x = 1 then it exits. Exiting rms have no choice for the next
period, i.e. kt+1 = nt+1 = bt+1 = 0: They exit by consuming all of their resources
remaining after wage and debt payment. All entrant rms have the same amount of
capital holding (kt+1 = k0 2 K  R+), labor (nt+1 = n0 2 [0; 1]) and bond holding
(bt+1 = b0 2 B  R) to be used in the subsequent period. All entrants assumed to
have high investment e¢ ciency. On the other hand, continuing rms adjust their
capital, labor and bond holdings as described above in capital, labor and credit
adjustments paragraphs, respectively.
Timing of events Timing of events are illustrated in Figure 4. Firms start
period t by knowing their capital, labor and bond holding level. At the beginning
of period t; idiosyncratic investment e¢ ciency levels are revealed and exit shock
occurs. Firms which will not survive to the next period produce, pay their wages
and debt and uninstall their capital, then nally consume all of their remaining
resources. Continuing rms produce and decide their capital (kt+1), labor (nt+1)
and bond holdings (bt+1) for the next period.
After posting vacancies, continuing rms enter to the labor market to hire work-
ers. Newly hired workers become employed and start to produce in the next period.
Meanwhile,  of employed workers in each rm hit by job separation shock and
38
become unemployed. These unemployed workers and workers who become unem-
ployed because their rms exit the market start to look for a new job in the next
period. At the end of period t; new rms enter with k0 level of capital, n0 level of
labor and b0 level of bond.
t  1
t
t+ 1
rms know their kt; nt;bt
draw z
exit shock
exiting rms: produce, wage negotiation & payment
continuing rms: produce, decide k0; n0; b0
job separation shock
wage negotiation & match
entry of new rms with k0; n0; b0
rms know their kt+1; nt+1;bt+1
Kt+1; Nt+1; Bt+1 are known
Figure 4: Timing of events
Firms Problem
A rm enters period t with k 2 K  R+; n 2 [0; 1] and b 2 B  R and learns
its e¢ ciency level, z 2 fzL; zHg ; and exit status, x 2 f0; 1g ; at the beginning of
that period. A rm is an exiting rm if x = 1; and it is a continuing rm if x = 0:
The problem solved by a rm at a state (k; n; b; z; x) is provided below by equations
(1)-(10).
V (k; n; b; z; x) = max
k0;n0;b0
i;v;c
fu (c) + (1  x) Ex0Ez0 [V (k0; n0; b0; z0; x0) jk; n; b]g (1)
subject to
c =
(
kn1  + (1 + r) b  wn  i  b0   C (v) if x = 0
kn1  + (1 + r) b  wn+ pk (1  ) k if x = 1
(2)
k0 =
(
zi+ (1  ) k if x = 0
0 if x = 1
(3)
n0 =
(
(1  )n+ qv if x = 0
0 if x = 1
(4)
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C (v) =
1
2
v2 (5)
c  0 (6)
i  0 if x = 0
i =  pk (1  ) k if x = 1
(7)
(1 + r) b
0   'k0 if x = 0
b0 = 0 if x = 1
(8)
v  0 if x = 0
v = 0 if x = 1
(9)
z0 =
(
zH with probability 
zL with probability (1  )
(10)
Equation (1) shows that an exiting rm (x = 1) does not solve a problem, and
only gets utility from its consumption in the current period. Yet, continuing rm
(x = 0) decides on optimal amount of capital, labor and bond holding for the next
period. Equation (2) is the budget constraint of an entrepreneur. Di¤erent from a
continuing rm, an exiting rm does not spend on investment, vacancy and does
not hold bonds for the next period. It only consumes its resources remained after
paying its debt and wage cost. Moreover, it has an extra resource coming from
salvage capital of which price is lower than a consumption goods price (pk < 1).
Equations (3) and (4) are, respectively, law of motions for capital and labor. Second
lines of these equations imply that exiting rm does not carry capital and labor for
the next period. To understand better the models intuitions, recall that z in the
rst row of equation (3) is the e¢ ciency of investment technology of a continuing
rm. It implies that a rm with high z accumulate more amount of capital with the
same amount of investment done by a rm with low z: Equation (5) is the vacancy
posting cost function. The convexity of this equation brings further heterogeneity
where the main source of heterogeneity comes from investment e¢ ciency. It also
has a limiting e¤ect on opening vacancy by making frictions higher when higher
number of vacancies are opened. Equations from (6) to (9) are, respectively, non-
negative consumption, irreversible investment, borrowing and non-negative vacancy
constraints. In addition, as shown by second line of equation (8) a rm can not exit
with a debt or do not save for the next period.
Denote z;,   and 	 as Lagrangian multipliers of constraints (6), (7), (8) and
(9), respectively, for continuing rms.26 Note that these multipliers are functions
of state variables (k; n; b; z; x) but for notational simplicity they are omitted. By
plugging all constraints holding with equality into relevant constraints, one can
26Notice that z = 0 when log utility assumption is made.
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obtain a continuing rms Euler equations for capital, labor and bond holding. They
are, respectively, given by
Uc;x=0 +zx=0  
z
   ' = Ez0
(
x (Uc0;x=1 +z0x=1)
"


k0x=0
n0x=0
 1
+ pk (1  )
#
+(1  x)
 
(Uc0;x=0 +z0x=0)
"


k0x=0
n0x=0
 1
+
1  
z0
#
 
0 (1  )
z0

(11)
v (Uc;x=0 +zx=0) 	
q
= Ez0

x (Uc0;x=1 +z0x=1)

(1  )

k0x=0
n0x=0

  w0x=1

+(1  x)

(Uc0;x=0 +z0x=0)

(1  )

k0x=0
n0x=0

  w0x=0
+
 (1  )
q
v0x=0

  	
0 (1  )
q

(12)
Uc;x=0 +zx=0     (1 + r) =  (1 + r)Ez0 fx (Uc0;x=1 +z0x=1)
+ (1  x) (Uc0;x=0 +z0x=0)g (13)
The RHS of equation (11) shows expected benet of capital accumulation in
terms of utility while the LHS is its cost. The LHS makes it clear that having high
level of investment e¢ ciency decreases the cost of investment.
Similarly, RHS of equation (12) displays expected benet of hiring in terms of
utility while the LHS is the cost of hiring. By plugging uc + z obtained from
equation (11) into equation (12), one can see that hiring costs more for a rm with
high current investment e¢ ciency. It is because investing becomes more e¢ cient
with higher z and this increases the opportunity cost of hiring. The tension between
investment and hiring is due to vacancy posting cost assumption which is a function
of vacancy. In other words, if a constant vacancy posting cost was assumed, then
the cost would be independent of quantity of posted vacancy, i.e. v (Uc;x=0 +zx=0)
term would not appear in LHS, so there would be no tension between investing and
vacancy posting. Furthermore, a convexity assumption for vacancy posting cost
implies that this tension raises as a rm increases its vacancy level.
Also, RHS of equation (13) presents expected benet of lending in terms of utility
while the LHS is the cost of lending. In the same manner, by plugging uc +z into
equation (13) it is clear that lending also costs more for rm having high investment
e¢ ciency in the current period due to its opportunity cost increase.
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2.2.4 Workers
Workers are assumed to be either employed or unemployed. I assume hand-to-
mouth workers who immediately consume their earnings and do not save. So, in
this model economy workers do not solve a problem. However, in order to obtain
total match surplus which is going to be used in wage determination, it is necessary
to know workersmatch surplus. And in order to obtain the latter, it is necessary
to know workersvalue functions when they are employed and unemployed. Each
worker supplies labor inelastically. In each period, workers consume all of their
income. Income of an employed worker is wage, w; while income of an unemployed
worker is benet, ben.27
An employed workers value function who works in a rm at a state (k; n; b; z; x)
is given by
WE (k; n; b; z; x) = w + fxWU + (1  x) [WU + (14)
(1  )Ex0Ez0 (WE (k0; n0; b0; z0; x0) jk; n; b)]g
Employed workers value function is a function of rm states for which he is working.
For the current period he earns wage, w: If a worker works in a rm which is hit by
an exit shock at the beginning of the period he starts next period as an unemployed
worker where WU denotes his value function. But if he is employed in a continuing
rm, then with  probability he will be unemployed and will haveWU and with 1 
probability he will continue to work for the same rm. His expected value of being
employed in that rm will be a function of that rms states in the next period.
An unemployed workers value function is given by
WU = ben+  f(1  q)WU+ (15)
q
"X
k;n;b
X
x
X
z
pv (k; n; b; z; x)Ex0Ez0WE (k
0; n0; b0; z0; x0)
#)
where
pv (k; n; b; z; x) =
 (k; n; b; z; x) gv (k; n; b; z; x)P
k;n;b
P
x
P
z  (k; n; b; z; x) gv (k; n; b; z; x)
(16)
where gv (k; n; b; z; x) is the policy function of vacancy. Note thatX
k;n;b
X
x
X
z
pv (k; n; b; z; x)Ex0Ez0WE (k
0; n0; b0; z0; x0) =WE (17)
27As it is standard in the search and matching literature, income ben is interpreted as unem-
ployment benet or home production.
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Unemployed worker earns ben for the current period. In the next period, he will be
unemployed with probability 1   q or nd a job with probability q in one of the
existing rms. Conditional on being employed in the next period, the probability
of being employed in a rm which will be at a state (k0; n0; b0; z0; x0) is a function
of the number of vacancies opened by that rm in the current period. More pre-
cisely, as shown by equation (16), the probability of matching with a rm at a state
(k0; n0; b0; z0; x0) is given by the share of vacancies opened by those rms in the current
period over the aggregate vacancy opened. Thus, the term in the square brackets
in equation (15) is the average expected value of being employed, denote as WE:
Since ben and WE are independent of rms state, WU is not a function of any rm
states.
2.2.5 Wage Determination
As mentioned before, matching creates a rent to be shared between a rm and a
worker because of costs faced by them. In the model economy, unemployed workers
bear only time cost. They start to look for a job one period after they become un-
employed and during unemployment period they earn unemployment benet which
is less than wage. Similarly, not lling a vacant job is costly for rms because of
vacancy posting cost. Since it is paid before matching occurs, it is a sunk cost. I
assume that the rent yielded by matching is shared by bilateral bargaining between
the rm and the worker. Wage bargaining is continuous, i.e. wage renegotiation
happens whenever a new information arrives. This implies that wage of continuing
workers employed in continuing rms is updated with new hires. In the same man-
ner, wages of workers employed in exiting rms is renegotiated after the exit shock
before the end of the period. Following Pissarides (2000), rms engage in bargain-
ing with each employee separately, by taking the wages of all other employees as
given. Thus I assume no intra-rm bargaining in the sense that rms are not able to
manipulate strategically wages by changing their labor, capital and bond choices.28
Firm surplus obtained from matching is the marginal value of having one ad-
28Cahuc andWasmer (2001) and Cahuc et al. (2008) introduce intra-rm bargaining of Stole and
Zwiebel (1996) into search and matching setup of Pissarides (2000) to study e¤ect of wage setting
on rms employment decision. In Stole and Zwiebel (1996) setup, intra-rm bargaining leads to
overemployment in equilibrium, thus to wages equal to workersreservation wage. However, Cahuc
(2001) shows that due to prematch hiring costs wages are larger than workersreservation wage
unless costs and/or workersbargaining power are equal to zero. Moreover, Cahuc et al. (2008)
point out that overemployment phenomenon put forth by Stole and Zwiebel (1996) does not play
an important role at the macroeconomic level when labor is homogenous regarding their bargaining
power even in the presence of capital in production function and an instantaneous change of the
latter is not possible when workers quit the rm.
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ditional worker in the current period (Merz (1995)). It is given by the envelope
condition with respect to labor in the rms problem and provided below as
FS  Vn (k; n; b; z; x)
where
Vn (k; n; b; z; 1) = (Uc;x=1 +zx=1)

(1  )

kx=1
nx=1

  wx=1

(18)
Vn (k; n; b; z; 0) = (Uc;x=0 +zx=0)

(1  )

kx=0
nx=0

  wx=0 (19)
+
 (1  )
q
vx=0

  	(1  )
q
Equation (18) is the surplus of an exiting rm while equation (19) is continuing
rms surplus. In both cases, marginal utility of consumption, lagrange multiplier
of consumption constraint, marginal product of labor and wage are common items
of surplus. However, continuing rms surplus has extra two terms due to having an
additional worker. Having an additional worker increases continuing rms surplus
on the one hand. Because it decreases the need for an extra vacancy to hire a worker
for the next period and provides a cost advantage to the rm from not opening a
vacancy ((1 )
q
vx=0). On the other hand, it tightens the vacancy constraint leading
to a decrease in the constraint ( 	(1 )
q
).
Worker surplus is given by
WS  WE (k; n; b; z; x) WU (20)
= w   ben+ sth
where
sth = [x+ (1  x)  (1  q)]WU+(1  x) (1  )ExEz (WE (s0; z0; x0) js) qWE
For the solution it is important to note that sth is independent of wage, i.e. @sth
@w
= 0.
The equilibrium wage paid by a rm at a state (k; n; b; z; x) solves the following
problem in equation (21), where the rst term is the workers surplus and the second
term is the rm surplus divided by entrepreneurs marginal utility of consumption
in order to express both surplus in the same units.
max
w
WS

FS
uc
1 
(21)
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where  2 [0; 1] is the bargaining power of the worker.
There is no analytical solution for the sharing problem given in (21). The equi-
librium wage schedule, w (k; n; b; z; x), can be solved computationally by guess and
verify. Nevertheless, it is computationally too costly due to existence of large sized
endogenous state variables. Therefore, in the numerical exercise I start with a much
simpler wage schedule which is the weighted average of marginal product of labor
(MPN) and unemployment income (ben) given below
w = MPN + (1  ) ben
= (1  )

k
n

+ (1  ) ben
This simplication can be justied with the theory and evidence presented in
Haefke et al. (2013). In this paper, they show that job creation decision depends
on permanent wage, not on actual wage. Accordingly, wage setting only matters
as it a¤ects the response of the permanent wage to changes in permanent labor
productivity. Their simulation results show that the elasticity of the permanent
wages with respect to labor productivity is very close to the elasticity of wages
of newly hired workers with respect to current labor productivity. Moreover, they
present that the latter is 0.80 in data. Thus, any wage schedule as a weighted average
of labor productivity and workers outside option that gives a weight close to 1 to
labor productivity will be consistent with the labor market equilibrium condition
as discussed in Haefke et al. (2013). In this simplication, I use the wage equation
given in Haefke et al (2013) which is obtained by solving the standard search and
matching model in steady state where  = 1  (1= 1+e)(1 )
1= 1+e+f : However, for ; e; f; 
I use my own calibration targets.
2.2.6 Equilibrium
Given world interest rate r; states of entrant rms (k0; n0; b0), rm exit probabil-
ity x and job separation rate ; a recursive stationary equilibrium consists of a set of
wages fw (k; n; b; z; x)g ; a set of value functions fV (k; n; b; z; x) ;WE (k; n; b; z; x) ;WUg ;
a set of decision rules for rms fgk (k; n; b; z; x) ; gn (k; n; b; z; x) ; gb (k; n; b; z; x) ;
gi (k; n; b; z; x) ; gv (k; n; b; z; x) ; gc (k; n; b; z; x)g; matching probabilities q () and
f () ; and the distribution of rms  (k; n; b; z; x) which satisfy
i. Given w (k; n; b; z; x) ; r; q () ;  (k; n; b; z; x) ; V (k; n; b; z; x) solve rms prob-
lem. gk (k; n; b; z; x) ; gn (k; n; b; z; x) ; gb (k; n; b; z; x) ; gi (k; n; b; z; x) ; gv (k; n; b; z; x) ;
gc (k; n; b; z; x) are the associated policy functions for rms.
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ii. Given w (k; n; b; z; x) ; f () ;  (k; n; b; z; x) ; WE (k; n; b; z; x) and WU are re-
spectively employed and unemployed workers value functions.
iii. Aggregate resource constraint holds.P
k;n;b
P
x
P
z gc (k; n; b; z; x) (k; n; b; z; x)
+ (1  x)
P
k;n;b
P
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iv. Labor market
a. Total number of employed workers (N) and unemployed workers (U) is
equal to the total number of workers in the economy.
N + U = 1
b. The amount of job nding workers is equal to the amount of workers who
become unemployed because of either job separation shock or rm exit shock.
fU = e (1  U)
where e = x +  (1  x) :29
v. Matching probabilities q () and f () are functions of equilibrium unemploy-
ment, U; and vacancy, V AC:
vi. The wage function, w (k; n; b; z; x) ; is determined by Nash bargaining between
a rm and a worker as a solution of problem given by (21).
vii. Distribution is consistent with rm decisions:
 (k0; n0; b0; z0; x0) =
X
k;n;b
X
x
X
z
 (z) I (k; n; b; k0; n0; b0; z) (k; n; b; z; 0) +X
k;n;b
X
x
X
z
 (z) Ient (k; n; b; k0; n0; b0; z) (k; n; b; z; 1)
29Note that there are two reasons that make an employed worker unemployed; either his rm
is hit by an exit shock with x probability or he works in a continuing rm but he is hit by a job
separation shock with  probability. Then at each period xN + (1  x)N of employed workers
become unemployed, implying that e = x +  (1  x) :
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where
I (k; n; b; k0; n0; b0; z) =
8><>:
1 if (k; n; b) = (gk (k; n; b; z; 0) ; gn (k; n; b; z; 0) ; gb (k; n; b; z; 0))
and z = zH
0 otherwise
and
Ient (k; n; b; k0; n0; b0; z) =
(
1 if (k; n; b) = (k0; n0; b0) and z = zH
0 otherwise
Note that distribution is stationary, i.e.  0 =  :
viii. Aggregate capital is consistent with rm decisions:
(1  x)
X
k;n;b
X
x
X
z
gk (k; n; b; z; 0) (k; n; b; z; 0) + xk0 = K
0
ix. Aggregate employment is consistent with rm decisions:
(1  x)
X
k;n;b
X
x
X
z
gn (k; n; b; z; 0) (k; n; b; z; 0) + xn0 = N
0
2.3 Calibration
The length of a period in the model economy is set to be one quarter of a year.
Pre-nancial development economy is the benchmark economy and calibrated to
1974Q1-1979Q4. Post-nancial period is from 2001Q1 to 2007Q4. I assume that
the benchmark economy is a small open economy with r = 0:01 (this interest rate
is consistent with the US long term real interest rate). Parameters can be found in
Table 6.
Preferences  is set so that r = 0:01 ( = 1
1+r
). Log utility is assumed for
entrepreneurs.
Technology Production function is specied as Cobb-Douglas production func-
tion.  is calibrated to match capital-output ratio in the US economy and it is 7:93
for the benchmark period.  is chosen to match investment-capital ratio which is
0:013. For both targets the methodology provided in Cooley and Prescott (1995)
is used. The denition of capital used in both targets is the same with the notion
of capital dened in Guner et al. (2012). It includes xed private capital, land,
inventories and consumer durables. Idiosyncratic investment e¢ ciency shock is as-
sumed to follow Pareto distribution with parameter  which is calibrated to match
47
the share of rms with positive investment in the benchmark period. Following Del
Negro et al. (2011) and Kiyotaki and Moore (2012), I use the annual data provided
in Gourio and Kashyap (2007) to calculate investor share. Accordingly, the share of
rms doing positive investment is 20% for the benchmark period.30
Entry-Exit Khan and Thomas (2013) reports that annual rm exit rate is 10%.
This corresponds to 2:5% at quarterly frequency, implying that x = 0:025: Also,
the resale price of capital pk is taken from Khan and Thomas (2013). Moreover,
I assume that entrant rmss state (k0; n0; b0) is the state of already existing rms
having minimum capital, minimum labor and zero bond holding.
Labor Market Four labor market parameters are calibrated: vacancy lling
probability (q), vacancy posting cost parameter (), matching function e¢ ciency
() ; and unemployment benet (ben). The rst three of these parameters are cali-
brated to match the following three targets: job nding probability (f), employment
exit probability
e and market tightness (). I set job nding probability to 0:78
and employment exit probability to 0:07 in quarterly frequency. For these targets,
using series provided in Shimer (2012), I rst calculate their monthly correspondents
for the benchmark period which are respectively 0:43 and 0:04 and convert them to
quarterly frequency using probability tree.31 Following Shimer (2005), market tight-
ness is normalized to one, i.e.   1: This target and job nding probability imply
that q =  = 0:78: Using the job separation probability together with the labor mar-
ket equilibrium condition (see item (iv.b) in the equilibrium denition), equilibrium
employment rate is found as 0:91:32 This value is consistent with the rate obtained
from seasonally adjusted CPS data which is equal to 0:93 for the benchmark period.
 is calibrated so that equilibrium employment rate is 0:91. ben is calibrated to
match benet-average wage ratio which is equal to 0:40; as given in Shimer (2005).
Following Shimer (2005), I set  =  = 0:72: The rst equality is set in order to
satisfy Hosios condition which discloses that equilibrium with unemployment is e¢ -
30Gourio and Kashyap (2007) classify rms in the manufacturing sector in seven groups with
respect to their investment to capital ratio. Only the rst group has zero investment, the rest has
non-zero investment. So, the share of rms having positive investment is given by the sum of these
six groups.
31In frequency conversion, for the job nding probability I assume that a worker is em-
ployed if she is employed at the end of third month. In other words, a worker is counted
in unemployment ratio even if he found a job at least once during the period but lost it at
the end of period (last month). Likewise, if a worker is unemployed for the rst two months
but nds a job in third month he is counted as employed. In the same manner, for the
frequency conversion of the employment exit probability, workers who are unemployed at the
end of period are counted in unemployment ratio. Let monthly job nding probability and
employment exit probability be fm and em, respectively and their quarterly correspondents
be f and e: Then f = fm 1  em2 + f2mem + (1  fm) fm 1  em + (1  fm)2 fm ande = em (1  fm)2 + e2mfm + 1  em em (1  fm) + 1  em2 em:
32Since labor force is normalized to 1, employment rate is equal to employment.
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cient when the matching function elasticity with respect to unemployment is equal
to the workers bargaining power.
Financial Market ' is equal to the corporate sector borrowing-capital ratio in
the economy for the benchmark period. Using non-nancial corporate sector balance
sheets issued by Board of Governors of Federal Reserve System, I construct credit
to non-nancial assets series to nd private credit-capital ratio. The credit den-
ition includes commercial papers, municipal securities and loans, corporate bonds,
depository institutions loans and other loans and advances, while the denition of
non-nancial assets includes real estate, equipment, intellectual property products
and inventories. For the benchmark period credit-capital is found as 0:07: For the
post-nancial development period the ratio is 0:11; meaning that the borrowing
amount increased by approximately 60%.33
33I also construct the target by using credit to GDP ratio provided in World Bank Global
Financial Development Database (GFDD) and by adjusting it by capital-output ratio which is
targeted for  calibration. For the credit to GDP ratio I use private credit by deposit money banks
and other nancial institutions to GDP series in the database (variable code: GFDD.DI.12). The
calculated ratio for the benchmark ratio is very similar to the one obtained from ow of fund
accounts and equal to 0:07. However, the ratio for the post-nancial development period is larger
and equal to 0:18, implying an increase in credit ratio more than double. I prefer to use more the
conservative ratio which is 0:11.
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2.4 Quantitative Analysis
The goal of this paper is to quantify the impact of nancial development on
the residual wage inequality increase in the US. For this purpose, I counterfactually
relax borrowing constraints that rms are subject to in the benchmark economy
(pre-nancial development economy). Then I compare the variance of wages in the
benchmark economy with its counterpart in the post-nancial development economy.
In the current setup, relaxing borrowing constraint corresponds to an increase in '.
I start the quantitative analysis by evaluating the performance of the model
economy built in this paper. Then, I explore how characteristics of the benchmark
economy change with nancial development and answer my main question. After the
counterfactual analysis, I control whether the model is robust to convexity degree
of vacancy posting cost function.
2.4.1 Benchmark Economy
Table 7 shows values of targeted variables generated by the model together with
their counterparts in data. Except the aggregate borrowing-capital ratio, the model
performs well in matching targets. The model generates an amount of borrowing
lower than the data.
Table 7: Benchmark economy
Variable Description Data Model
K/Y Capital-output ratio 7.93 8.01
B/K Borrowing-capital ratio 0.07 0.05
I/K Investment-capital ratio 0.0132 0.0132
Investor Share % of investors 0.20 0.20
f Job nding probability 0.782 0.788
 Labor market tightness 1 1.01e Employment exit probability 0.0728 0.0726
ben/w Benet-average wage ratio 0.4 0.394
Note: This table reports values of targeted variables in data and their counterparts
generated by the model.
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2.4.2 Counterfactual Analysis: Financial Development
In this section, I rst explore steady-state implications of nancial development
on aggregates, rm distribution regarding state variables and bond holding behavior
of rms in the economy. Then, I answer the main question of this paper and present
the quantitative impact of nancial development on residual wage inequality increase
in the US.
Results on changes in rm distribution and aggregates after nancial develop-
ment are summarized by Figure 5, and Tables 8 and 9. Figure 5 illustrates, sepa-
rately, the mass of rms with respect to state variables before and after nancial
development. Chart A presents the distribution of rms regarding bond while Chart
B and C show distribution of rms regarding capital and labor, respectively. Firm
distributions in the pre-nancial development economy are demonstrated by graphs
on the left and those in post-nancial development economy are shown by graphs
on the right. Table 8 shows key aggregates describing the economy before and after
nancial development. Table 9 displays change in borrowing and lending behavior
of rms after nancial development.
Figure 5, Chart A shows that there is a big change in the rm distribution in
terms of rmsbond holding. It shifts to the left as a result of looser borrowing
constraints suggesting that the mass of borrowing rms increases while the mass
of lending rms decreases. Not surprisingly, this leads to an increase in aggregate
borrowing and a decrease in aggregate lending. Table 8 displays that the aggregate
borrowing increases by 123.5% leading to an increase in aggregate borrowing-capital
ratio by 83.4%. The increase in borrowing-capital ratio mostly stems from an in-
crease in borrowing of rms with zL, of which borrowing-capital ratio raises by
93.1%. Its counterpart for the rms having zH is 59.2%. Still, borrowing-capital
ratio of rms with zH is larger than that of rms with zL indicating that borrowing
of e¢ cient rms is larger than that of ine¢ cient rms. Likewise, as Table 9 shows,
all of the rms with zH are borrower both before and after nancial development.
However, 74% of rms with zL is borrower in the pre-nancial development economy
while the share increases to 88% in the post-nancial development economy. And
these rms are the reason of increase in share of borrowers after nancial develop-
ment.
Meanwhile, the rm distribution in terms of capital shifts to the right and be-
comes more left-skewed as Figure 5, Chart B illustrates. Notice that the reason
of a large mass of rms at the minimum level of capital is the entry of new rms.
Except these rms, the rm distribution regarding capital becomes more left-skewed
in the post-nancial development economy, and this implies that the share of rms
holding large amounts of capital increases in this new stationary economy. Results
52
presented in Table 8 are in line with this nding. The increase in aggregate capital
and investment is 21.9% and it is 12.7% for capital-labor ratio. It is not surprising
that the rise in aggregate capital is driven by an investment increase. And, this
increase in aggregate investment is generated by rms having high investment ef-
ciency although their share remains the same in the post-nancial development
economy. On the other hand, there are some rms having low investment e¢ ciency
which do not invest in the pre-nancial development economy but start to invest in
the post-nancial development economy. However, their contribution to the increase
in aggregate investment is near zero, because their investment amounts are close to
zero.
Besides, nancial development does not create a distinct variation in the rm
distribution regarding labor which can be observed from Figure 5, Chart C. Likewise,
Table 8 shows that aggregate labor rises by a very limited amount, which is 0.4%.
This amount of rise creates an increase in equilibrium job nding probability by 3.3%
and market tightness by 4.7%, but a decrease in job separation rate by 1.3%. These
ndings can be summarized as follows: in the post-nancial development economy,
job nding for an unemployed worker is easier while it is relatively di¢ cult for a rm
to ll a vacant job compared to the pre-nancial development economy. Moreover,
after nancial development there is an increase in average wage which is equal to
7.8%.
Briey, with nancial development both types of rms start to borrow more.
Capital accumulation in the economy increases, and although it is mostly due to
rms with zH ; there is a small amount of rms with zL which start to invest. Em-
ployment level increases after nancial development but the increase is small. Thus,
one can talk an overall improvement in the post-nancial development economy
contrary to my expectation of heterogeneity increase in rm distribution regarding
capital-labor ratio. This result can be seen from changes in statistics provided in
Table 10. Variance of wage, variance of capital-labor ratio and variance of capital
increase at the level while they all decrease at the log level, implying that there are
large increases in their mean values supporting my claim of overall improvement
in the economy. On the other hand, variance of labor decreases both in level and
log-level. Finally, nancial development increases variance of wages by 2.8% but
decreases variance of log wages by 8.6%.
2.4.3 Robustness
In this section, I investigate whether model results are sensitive to the quadratic
vacancy posting cost function assumption. For this purpose, I consider two exercises
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Figure 5: Mass of rms with respect to labor, capital and bond holdings before (left)
and after (right) nancial development
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Table 8: Aggregates before and after nancial development
Variable Benchmark Alternative  (%)
BOND -0.89 -2.17 144.2
BORROW -0.99 -2.21 123.5
LEND 0.10 0.05 -54.0
B/K 0.05 0.09 83.4
B/K, zL 0.05 0.09 93.1
B/K, zH 0.07 0.11 59.2
CAPITAL 19.68 23.99 21.9
K/Y 8.01 9.02 12.7
INVEST 0.26 0.32 21.9
I/K 0.0132 0.0132 0.1
% of investors 20 22 7.3
% of investors, zL 0 2 1409.7
% of investors, zH 20 20 -0.1
LABOR 0.9156 0.9191 0.4
average wage 1.69 1.82 7.8
f 0.79 0.81 3.3
 1.01 1.06 4.7e 0.07 0.07 -1.3
ben/w 0.39 0.37 -7.2
Note: This table reports some of the aggregates in the benchmark economy, their
counterparts in the alternative economy and percentage change between them.
Table 9: Shares of borrowers and lenders
Benchmark Alternative
Share of Borrowers 0.790 0.903
Share of Lenders 0.164 0.076
Share of Borrowers with zL 0.736 0.878
Share of Borrowers with zH 1 1
Share of Lenders with zL 0.21 0.096
Share of Lenders with zH 0 0
Note: This table reports total share of borrowers and lenders, and share
of borrowers and lenders within each rm type in terms of investment
e¢ ciency both in the benchmark and the alternative economies.
in which convexity level of vacancy posting cost di¤erentiate and explore whether
the implications of nancial development on the residual wage inequality change
with these di¤erent convexity levels. In the rst case, I assume a higher level of
convexity compared to its counterpart in the benchmark economy and in the sec-
ond case, I assume a lower convexity level. I set the higher and the lower values
following Gali and van Rens (2014).34 In this paper authors assume an employ-
ment adjustment cost function as 1
1+
v1+ and they report that estimates of the
34Gali and van Rens (2014) is the newer version of Gali and van Rens (2010).
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Table 10: Change in statistics (%)
var(w) 2.83
var(ln(w)) -8.57
var(k/n) 25.15
var(ln(k/n)) -8.71
var(k) 26.38
var(ln(k)) -6.22
var(n) -0.44
var(ln(n)) -0.07
Note: This table reports changes in variances
of wage, log-wage, capital-labor ratio, log-
capital-labor ratio, capital, log-capital, labor
and log-labor after nancial development.
convexity of employment adjustment costs vary at a range in between 1.6 and 3.4,
so that 1 +  2 [1:6; 3:4]: In the benchmark economy, I use 1 +  = 2: Now, for
lower heterogeneity I set 1 +  to 1.6 and for higher heterogeneity I set it to 3.4.
For these new convexity parameters I perform, separately, the same benchmark and
counterfactual analysis.
Results make it clear that model implications after nancial development are
robust to the convexity level of vacancy posting cost function. In both cases the
economy improves in overall after nancial development. Variations in rm distrib-
utions, aggregates, borrowing-lending behaviors are in the same direction. Similarly,
in each case variances of wage, capitallabor ratio, capital and labor increase in level
but decrease in log-level. Nevertheless, the magnitude of increases, including those
of aggregates and variances, gets larger as convexity degree decreases. For instance,
aggregate capital increases by 20.4% for the higher convexity level while it increases
by 22.3% for the lower convexity level. Likewise, for the higher convexity degree,
increase in investor share is 0.6% while it is 7.6% for the lower level of convexity.
Concurrently, variance of wage rises by 2.2% in level but decreases by 9.3% in log-
level for the higher convexity degree while the increase is 4.5% and the decrease is
6.6% for the lower convexity.
Currently, I only assess the robustness of results to the convexity of vacancy
posting cost function. However, it is worth to indicate that, there are some other
important robustness checks which would probably give more insights about the
model. One of them is to increase the number of rm types regarding their invest-
ment e¢ ciency. In the current paper, because of computational burden of the model,
I assume only two levels of investment e¢ ciency: zH and zL which are relatively far
from each other.35 For the moment, I left solving the computational burden problem
35The computational burden of the model which has three endogenous state variables (capital,
labor and bond) in large sizes and two exogenous state variables (entry-exit status and investment
e¢ ciency type) is already heavy. It takes already too much time to get results. Increasing the
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as the next step of this research.
After solving the computational burden problem, increasing rm types probably
gives possibility to match more statistics on rm dynamics in the data, like rm-
size distribution, and more robustness checks can be made in this new environment
which is closer to the data. For instance, the implications of nancial development
on residual wage inequality can be explored in a closed economy setup. Making r
adjust endogenously in the model might di¤erentiate rmsdecisions on borrowing
and lending. And this might possibly a¤ect capital distribution, so capital-labor
heterogeneity in the economy.
2.5 Conclusion
Residual wage inequality increase in the US is a widely discussed topic of labor
economics. Several reasons as SBTC, minimum wages, compositional changes in the
US labor market, trade liberalization, decrease in capital prices and nancial devel-
opment, are put forward previously to explain the rise in this inequality. However,
studies exploring the impact of nancial development on residual wage inequality
increase is rare. In fact, to the best of my knowledge, there is only Jerzmanowski
and Nabar (2013).
In the current paper, I also examine the role of nancial development in the
residual wage inequality increase in the US but in a very di¤erent setup provided
in Jerzmanowski and Nabar (2013). I built a model where the nancial develop-
ment a¤ects the residual wage inequality increase in the US by changing the rm
distribution in terms of capital-labor ratio. Although I set the mechanism with an
expectation of an increase in residual wage inequality as a result of an increase in
rm distribution in terms of capital-labor ratio which is driven by nancial devel-
opment, ndings tell a story other way around. The variance of wages and the
variance of capital-labor ratio increase, but they decrease at the log-level, implying
an overall improvement in the economy. This is because nancial development cre-
ates an increase in capital holdings of most of the rms in the economy leading to
a more left-skewed rm distribution in terms of capital while the rm distribution
with respect to labor remains almost the same. As these are the major components
of wages, direction of changes in their distribution induces the results for wages.
Assuming two levels of investment e¢ ciency which are relatively far to each
other might be the most critical issue in the setup of the current paper. It would be
number of rm types regarding investment e¢ ciency will increase the time to get results.
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useful to check robustness of results with respect to this assumption by increasing
the number of rm types regarding investment e¢ ciency. However, computational
burden of the model constrained me to do this robustness check. Figuring out the
computational burden problem is left as the rst follow-up step of this research.
Then in an environment where rm types are numerous, various robustness checks
which would probably give more insights about the model are going to be possible.
After having more insights about the model, one possible direction for future
research is to analyze the role of changes in nancial markets (in terms of access
to nance) on rm distribution and residual wage inequality for di¤erent periods.
For instance, exploring the impact of the last nancial depression in the US on rm
distribution and residual wage inequality would be a good starting point.
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2.A Appendix: Algorithm
1. Discrete grid on (k; n; b; z; x) is used for value functions and wage function.
x = 0 for continuing rms and x = 1 for entrant rms.
(a) Set lower and upper limits and grid points for endogenous state variables
k1; k2; :::kNk
n1; n2; :::nNn
b1; b2; :::bNb
(b) Obtain grids for exogenous state variable by discretizing Pareto distrib-
ution; zL; zH
2. Given r and  set wage
w (k; n; b; z; x) = MPN + (1  ) ben
3. Solve continuing rms problem
(a) Guess an initial value function for rms at each state, V 0 (k; n; b; z; 1) :
(b) Penalize (i.e. assign very low values to utility) states violating non-zero
consumption, irreversible-investment, borrowing and non-zero vacancy
constraints.
(c) Maximize the rms problem given in (1), nd V 1 (k; n; b; z; 1) :
(d) If jV 1   V 0j < V stop, otherwise make a new guess for value function.
Return to 3c and use V 1 as a new guess.
(e) Obtain gk (k; n; b; z; 1) ; gn (k; n; b; z; 1) ; gb (k; n; b; z; 1) ; gc (k; n; b; z; 1) ;
gv (k; n; b; z; 1) ; gi (k; n; b; z; 1) :
4. Knowing capital, employment and borrowing decisions of continuing rms
and initial states of entrant rms, calculate invariant distribution of rms,
 (k; n; b; z; x) :
5. Calculate aggregates: K;N;B; V AC; I; Y:
K =
X
k;n;b
X
x
X
z
k (k; n; b; z; x) (k; n; b; z; x)
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N =
X
k;n;b
X
x
X
z
n (k; n; b; z; x) (k; n; b; z; x)
B =
X
k;n;b
X
x
X
z
b (k; n; b; z; x) (k; n; b; z; x)
V AC = (1  x)
X
k;n;b
X
z
gv (k; n; b; z; 1) (k; n; b; z; 1) + x
n0
q
I = (1  x)
X
k;n;b
X
z
gi (k; n; b; z; 1) (k; n; b; z; 1) +
x
 
k0   pk (1  )
X
k;n;b
X
z
k (k; n; b; z; 0) (k; n; b; z; 0)
!
Y =
X
k;n;b
X
x
X
z
(k (k; n; b; z; x)) (n (k; n; b; z; x))1   (k; n; b; z; x)
Original Version - Before simplication (normalization of , wage setting, small
open economy assumption)
1. Discrete grid on (k; n; b; z; x) is used for value functions and wage function.
x = 0 for continuing rms and x = 1 for entrant rms.
(a) Set lower and upper limits and grid points for endogenous state variables
k1; k2; :::kNk
n1; n2; :::nNn
b1; b2; :::bNb
(b) Obtain grids for exogenous state variable by discretizing Pareto distrib-
ution; zL; zH
2. Guess a wage function ! (k; n; b; z; x)
3. Guess r
4. Guess 
5. Solve continuing rms problem
(a) Guess an initial value function for rms at each state, V 0 (k; n; b; z; 1) :
(b) Penalize (i.e. assign very low values to utility) states violating non-zero
consumption, irreversible-investment, borrowing and non-zero vacancy
constraints.
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(c) Maximize the rms problem given in (1), nd V 1 (k; n; b; z; 1) :
(d) If jV 1   V 0j < V stop, otherwise make a new guess for value function.
Return to 5c and use V 1 as a new guess.
(e) Repeat until convergence.
(f) Obtain gk (k; n; b; z; 1) ; gn (k; n; b; z; 1) ; gb (k; n; b; z; 1) ; gc (k; n; b; z; 1) ;
gv (k; n; b; z; 1) ; gi (k; n; b; z; 1) :
6. Knowing capital, employment and borrowing decisions of continuing rms
and initial states of entrant rms, calculate invariant distribution of rms,
 (k; n; b; z; x) :
7. Calculate aggregates: K;N;B; V AC; I; Y:
K =
X
k;n;b
X
x
X
z
k (k; n; b; z; x) (k; n; b; z; x)
N =
X
k;n;b
X
x
X
z
n (k; n; b; z; x) (k; n; b; z; x)
B =
X
k;n;b
X
x
X
z
b (k; n; b; z; x) (k; n; b; z; x)
V AC = (1  x)
X
k;n;b
X
z
gv (k; n; b; z; 1) (k; n; b; z; 1) + x
n0
q
I = (1  x)
X
k;n;b
X
z
gi (k; n; b; z; 1) (k; n; b; z; 1) +
x
 
k0   pk (1  )
X
k;n;b
X
z
k (k; n; b; z; 0) (k; n; b; z; 0)
!
Y =
X
k;n;b
X
x
X
z
(k (k; n; b; z; x)) (n (k; n; b; z; x))1   (k; n; b; z; x)
8. If B > 0 decrease r:
9. If  < target decrease cost (decrease ), and vice-versa.
10. Iterate workersvalue functions and nd WE (k; n; b; z; x) and WU :
11. Nash bargaining: Solve the problem (21) for w, and nd w1:
12. If jw1   w0j < w stop, otherwise make a new guess for the wage schedule.
Return to 2 and use w1 as a new guess.
13. Repeat until convergence.
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